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Can You Hear Me Now?: Private Communication,
National Security, and the Human
Rights Disconnect
Jordan J. Paust*
Abstract
This Article addresses the question whether global human rights law adequately
protects private communications of individuals from state and non-state actor eavesdropping,
data collection, and data mining engaged in for national security purposes. It concludes that
human rights protection is lacking and needs to be reformed if what are apparently current
public expectations about privag are to be adequately met. Not all persons are protected from
extraterritorial infringement of their privag interests, and there is a well-recognized test
regarding who is entitled to extraterritorial protection that precludes protection for most persons.
Further, the human right to private communication is not absolute. For those who have such a
right, sgnficant and far-reaching limitations exist that will often assure the propriety of various
forms of national security intrusion, especially in contexts of self-defense and war.
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"/Wfe must continue to ensure that our sgnals intellgence poliies and practices
appropriatey take into account... the leadershis role that the United States plays in
upholding democratic principles and universal human rights."'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Revelations regarding widespread and extraterritorial U.S. governmental
surveillance and data collection-and private corporations' facilitating role-
have sparked international debate about whether the U.S. surveillance program
is lawful under domestic and international law, especially relevant human rights
law. What has not been the primary concern in the U.S. is the equally important
question whether international law regulates increased foreign governmental
surveillance of natural and juridic persons in the U.S. for alleged foreign security
purposes, the answer to which cannot rely on the U.S. Constitution and
domestic laws. Human rights law recognizes a right to privacy that can restrain
some forms of extraterritorial surveillance, but is its reach sufficient?
This Article addresses the question whether global human rights law
adequately protects private communications of individuals from state and non-
state actor eavesdropping, data collection, and data mining for national security
purposes. It concludes that human rights protection is lacking and needs to be
reformed if current public expectations about privacy are to be adequately met.
As noted in Part II of this Article, relevant human rights law is universal in
reach despite a serious misunderstanding by prior U.S. administrations and a
putative U.S. reservation to a global human rights treaty. Although still
insufficiently understood, human rights law can reach non-state aiders and
abettors of human rights violations as well as state actor perpetrators and
facilitators-and both have participated in extraterritorial intelligence gathering
that has eroded individual and group privacy. However, as recognized in Part
III, not all persons are protected from extraterritorial infringement, and there is
a well-recognized test governing who is entitled to extraterritorial protection that
precludes most persons under most human rights instruments. This lack of
extraterritorial protection results in one form of human rights disconnect.
Another disconnect results from the nature of relevant substantive rights. As
noted in Part IV, the human right to private communication is not absolute. For
those who have such a right, significant and far-reaching limitations exist under
global human rights law that will often assure the propriety of various forms of
national security intrusion, especially in contexts of self-defense and war. Having
identified why extraterritorial human rights protection is generally lacking, this
Article suggests a modest policy-serving reform in Part V.
II. THE UNIVERSAL REACH OF RELEVANT HUMAN
RIGHTS LAW
A. The UN Charter
Article 55 of the UN Charter mandates that "the United Nations shall
promote . .. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and
Vol 15 No. 2614
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fundamental freedoms for all." 2 In referring to human rights, the Charter-based
mandate incorporates by reference human rights that are part of customary
international law and requires global respect for and observance of them.3
Whether the rights to privacy and private communication-or at least the
particular privacy interests-documented in several human rights instruments
are part of customary international law determines whether they are included in
those customary rights the UN Charter protects without geographic limits or
exclusions for persons outside the jurisdiction, actual power, or effective control
2 UN Charter art. 55(c). See id. art. 1(3).
3 See, for example, THOMAS BURRGENTHAL, DINAH SHELTON & DAVID STEWART, INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 30-33, 39-40, 124 (3d ed. 2002); MYRES S. McDOUGAIL, HAROLD
D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 274, 302, 325-27
(1980); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882-83 (2d Cir. 1980) (adding that Charter based
"guaranties include ... the right to freedom from torture. This prohibition has become part of
customary international law, as evidenced and defined by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights I"UDHR"].... Charter precepts embodied in this Universal Declaration 'constitute basic
principles of international law."'). The U.S. had previously claimed that the right to freedom from
arbitrary interference with privacy or correspondence reflected in Article 12 of the UDHR is part
of customary international law. See Memorial of the United States (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J.
Pleadings 121, 182 n.36 (Jan. 12) ("[Fundamental rights for all human beings..., and the
existence of a corresponding duty on the part of every State to respect and observe them, are now
reflected, inter alia, in the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and corresponding portions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.';
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 5 702,
cmt. m (1987) (stating that "a 'consistent pattern of gross violations' as state policy," such as
"invasions of the privacy of the home ... [and] denial of basic privacy such as the right to marry
and raise a family," is a violation of customary international law but not "when [violations are]
committed singly or sporadically") [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; George E. Edwards, International
Human Rights Law Challenges to the New International Criminal Court: The Search and SeiZure Right to
Privag, 26 YALEJ. INT'L L. 323, 390 (2001) ("A compelling case can be made that the search and
seizure right to privacy has risen to the level of customary international law."); Beharry v. Reno,
183 F. Supp. 2d 584, 601 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) ("'The rights to be free from arbitrary interference with
family life and arbitrary expulsion are part of customary international law."') (quoting Maria v.
McElroy, 68 F. Supp. 2d 206, 234 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)). But see International Law Association,
Committee on the Enforcement of Human Rights Law, Final Report on the Status of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law, in Report of the Sixty-Sixth Conference
525, 547 (Buenos Aires 1995) (noting the U.S. claim before the ICJ but stating that "the content
of the right would varies [sic] considerably among states, and the contours of that realm of
privacy which is beyond the reach of government is perhaps too vague to be deemed a useful part
of customary law.") [hereinafter ILA H.R. Report]; United States v. Covos, 872 F.2d 805, 808 (8th
Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 840 (1989) (finding that despite citation to a case before the
European Court of Human Rights that addressed privacy under European treaty law, defendant
"has not provided us with sufficient authority . . [to prove] that the warrantless use of a pen
register [regarding phone numbers called] is such an invasion of privacy as to violate [the
customary] international law of human rights"); sources cited infra notes 36, 118. For a right or
particular aspect thereof to be part of customary international law, it would have to be supported
by general patterns of practice and opiniojuris. See RESTATEMENT, supra, 5 102(1)(a)-(2), cmnts. b,
c; sources cited infra notes 46, 114.
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of a state. If not, such rights and privacy interests will be protected merely
through particular human rights treaties where those instruments reach. This UN
Charter-based mandate also conditions the authority of its entities, such as the
Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat, and even individual UN
personnel.'
UN members are similarly bound under Article 56 of the UN Charter "to
take joint and separate action . . . for the achievement of the purposes set forth
in Article 55."' Under Articles 55(c) and 56, the U.S. and other UN members
necessarily have a duty to promote through joint and separate action "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all"
and not to violate human rights within or outside of their territory.6 Clearly,
there are no geographical limitations on the obligation to promote universal
4 See, for example, McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 3, at 332-34; THE CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONs: A COMMENTARY 920, 923 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter
CHARTER COMM ENTARY].
5 UN Charter art. 56. Article 103 of the UN Charter mandates that, "[i]n the event of a conflict
between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and
their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present
Charter shall prevail." Id. art. 103. For this reason, if a particular human rights treaty does not
have universal reach, and there is a clash or inconsistency with respect to the universal character
of the obligation of a party under the UN Charter, the obligation under the Charter remains
extant and "shall prevail." As noted in Section III, most human rights instruments only reach
persons within the jurisdiction, actual power, or effective control of a state. The reach of the UN
Charter is not so limited and will prevail with respect to customary human rights guaranteed
thereunder. Therefore, the critical issue will shift from who is protected under customary human
rights incorporated into universal UN Charter obligations to what protections and limitations of
rights pertain. See infra Section IV.
6 See UN Charter arts. 55(c), 56; Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-Operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations (Oct. 24, 1970), U.N. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc.
A/8028, at 121 (1971) ("Every State has the duty to promote through joint and separate action
universal respect for and observance of human rights.") (emphasis added); HuRST HANNUM, S.
JAMEs ANAYA & DINAH L. SHEiTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW,
PO.ICY, AND PRACTICE 83 (5th ed. 2011) (.'M]embers of the United Nations have a legal duty to
promote respect for and protection of human rights around the world.") (quoting George
Aldrich, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State); McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 3,
at 339 ("[H]uman rights prescriptions are applicable ... to all the activities of nation-states and
their officials."). Concerning Charter-based human rights duties of states, see also Case
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), 1980
I.C.J. 3, 42 (May 24) ("Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them
to physical constraint in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles
enunciated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."); Advisory Opinion on the Legal
Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South-Africa in Namibia (South West
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 3, 57 (June 21)
[hereinafter Advisory Opinion South West Africa]; see generaly Memorial of the United States (U.S.
v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. Pleadings, supra note 3.
Vol. 15 No. 2616
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respect for and observance of human rights, and there are no other limits with
respect to social or political contexts, such as those involving terrorism, self-
defense, war, or threats to national security.' Any limits that exist with respect to
relevant customary human rights of particular persons depend on the nature and
reach of relevant human rights law that is incorporated by reference through
Articles 55(c) and 56 of the Charter. Importantly, the International Court of
Justice (ICJ) has recognized that "a denial of fundamental human rights is a
flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter,"8 a recognition
that must necessarily pertain to conduct engaged in for national security
purposes that violates relevant customary human rights.
B. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
The reach of one of the major human rights treaties, the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),' is also universal. The Preamble
to the ICCPR expressly refers to the extraterritorial nature of all UN members'
human rights obligations while "[c]onsidering the obligation of States under the
Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and freedoms.""o This recognition is crucial to proper
7 Human rights law applies during war. See, for example, JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 674, 687-88 (4th ed. 2013); Jordan J. Paust, Executive Plans and Autboriations to
Violate International LaIm Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 811, 820-23 (2005).
8 Advisory Opinion South West Africa, supra note 6, at 57, T 131. See sources cited supra notes 3, 6.
In 1948, two Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a California law barring land
ownership and occupancy by aliens on account of race "stands as a barrier to the fulfillment of'
the obligation under Articles 55(c) and 56 of the Charter, and "[ilts inconsistency with the
Charter ... is but one more reason why the statute must be condemned." Oyama v. California,
332 U.S. 633, 672-73 (1948) (Murphy and Rutledge, JJ., concurring).
9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR].
1o Id. pmbl. Importantly, other global human rights treaties contain the same express recognition.
See, for example, International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), pmbl., U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49 (Dec. 16,
1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced
Disappearance pmbl., adopted by U.N. G.A. Res. 61/177 (Dec. 20, 2006); Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment pmbl., Dec. 10, 1984,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]; see also Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms While Countering Terrorism pmbl., U.N. G.A. Res. 61/171 (Dec. 19, 2006)
("Reaffirming that States are under the obligation to protect all human rights and fundamental
freedoms of all persons."); 2005 World Summit Outcome, T 121, U.N. G.A. Res. 60/1 (Oct. 24,
2005) ("[A]ll human rights are universal... [and] all States... have the duty to promote and
protect human rights."); Promotion of a Democratic and Equitable International Order, U.N.
G.A. Res. 107, 1 5, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/107, at 3 (Dec. 4, 2000)
(stressing "that all human rights are universal ... and that all human rights must be treated in a
Winter 2015
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interpretation of the ICCPR and its extraterritorial reach." Additionally, Article 2
of the ICCPR affirms that each party must "respect and ... ensure to all
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights
recognized" in the ICCPR.12 As documented below in Section III, persons
protected outside a state's territory include those who are within the actual
power or effective control of a party to the 1CCPR.
During the Bush-Cheney era, the U.S. executive claimed ICCPR
fair and equal manner'; World Conference on Human Rights, Final Declaration and Programme
of Action, Sec I, 1 5, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12, 1993) ("All human rights are
universal, indivisible and interdependent and interrelated. The international community must treat
human rights globally ... [and] it is the duty of States, regardless of their political, economic and
cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms."); Universal
Declaration of Human Rights pmbl., G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948)
(promoting "universal respect for and observance of human rights"), art. 2 ("Everyone is entitled
to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration . . . no distinction shall be made on the
basis of the political, jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a
person belongs.") [hereinafter UDHR].
" Seefor example, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(2), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. As the Preamble notes, the creators of the ICCPR were
"[clonsidering" this universal Charter-based obligation when drafting it. ICCPR, supra note 9,
pmbl. Because Article 16, refers to a "right . . . everywhere" and the object and purpose of the
ICCPR is to assure real rights for all humans, the proper interpretation of the ICCPR is that it
reaches beyond the territory of a state party. See also Vienna Convention, supra, art. 31(1) ("A
treaty shall be interpreted in good faith . .. and in the [sic] light of its object and purpose."); U.N.
H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 24, General Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations
Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols, f 7, 11-12,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 2, 1994). The principle of pacta sunt semanda (which
requires performance of a treaty in good faith, see Vienna Convention, supra, art. 26) requires
parties to a treaty to adhere to its purpose and shared meaning "in such a manner that its purpose
can be realized." Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 133 (Sept.
25). Moreover, while interpreting a treaty, "[t]here shall be taken into account ... [a]ny relevant
rules of international law applicable," Vienna Convention, supra, art. 31(3)(c), meaning that the
universal human rights obligations under both the UN Charter and the other aforementioned
instruments bear on interpretation of ICCPR obligations. Importantly, the ICCPR also proscribes
restrictions "upon or derogations from any of the fundamental human rights recognized or
existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, . . . or custom
on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights or that it recognizes them
to a lesser extent." ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 5(2). Further, Article 46 states: "Nothing in the
present Covenant shall be interpreted as impairing the provisions of the Charter of the United
Nations." Id. art. 46. With respect to derogable rights, the Covenant also requires that states
adopting derogating measures assure that they "are not inconsistent with their obligations under
international law." Id. art. 4(1).
12 ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 2(1). The language is read as including all individuals who are "within its
territory" and all individuals who are otherwise "subject to its jurisdiction." Limiting the word
"jurisdiction" to territory of a state would make the phrase "and subject to their jurisdiction"
nonsensically redundant, contradict the recognition in general international law of forms of
extraterritorial jurisdiction and responsibility, and operate contrary to the universal reach of
human rights obligations under the UN Charter. See discussion supra note 11; see also discussion
infra notes 30, 33.
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obligations did not apply outside of U.S. territory. The claim was manifestly in
error, not only with respect to the universal nature of the 1CCPR but also its
widely recognized extraterritorial reach to any person who is within the actual
power or effective control of a member nation." Moreover, domestic
intelligence gathering, storage, and data mining, as well as decisions to engage in
such activities abroad, evidently take place within or emanate from the U.S.-
circumstances that are relevant to application of the ICCPR within the U.S.14
With respect to direct application of the ICCPR as U.S. treaty law, one
must ascertain whether its relevant provisions are self-executing. Provisions of a
treaty that are set forth in mandatory "shall" language are typically self-operative
or directly enforceable," and many of the provisions in the ICCPR contain such
language. When the U.S. ratified the ICCPR, it sought to change the self-
operative reach of most of the treaty's provisions by declaring it partially non-
self-executing," but because the declaration attempted to change the nature of
legal obligations under the treaty, it was treated as an attempted reservation."
Further, because it attempted to obviate the direct effect of most of the treaty's
provisions, the putative reservation, if operative, would have been seriously
13 See, for example, Jordan J. Paust, The Bush-Cheny Legay: Serial Torture and Forced Disappearance in
Manifest Violation of Global Human Rights Law, 18 BARRY L. Riv. 61-64, 71-74 & n.7 (2012); Beth
Van Schaack, The United States' Position on the Extraternitorial Application of Human Rights Obigations:
Now is the Time for Change, 90 INT'L L. STUD. 20, 24 (2014) ("The United States' so-called 'legal
position' actually reflects a strategic policy choice to endeavor to evade scrutiny of its
extraterritorial exploits on the merits."); Marko Milanovic, Foreign Surveillance and Human Rights:
Part 2: Interpreting the ICCPR, EJIL Talk (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/foreign-
surveillance-and-human-rights-part-2-interpreting-the-iccpr/?pfstyle= wp (last visited Nov. 18,
2014).
14 See, for example, Rebecca A. Copeland, War on Terrorism or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the
Lines of Intelligence Gathering in Post-September 11 America, 35 TEx. TECH L. R-v 1, 14 (noting that the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's "secret meetings in which the court considers
applications for electronic surveillance take place in the 'Special Compartmentalized Intelligence
Facility' within the Department of justice in Washington, D.C.").
15 See JORDAN J. PAUST, JON M. VAN DYKE & LINDA A. MALONE, INTERNATIONAi LAW AND
LITIGATION IN THE U.S. 278, 289 (3d ed. 2009). As the U.S. Supreme Court has often affirmed,
treaties are also to be construed in a broad manner to protect express and implied rights, and
whenever a right grows out of or is protected by a treaty, it is self-executing. See also id. at 274,
279, 284-85. Clearly, the ICCPR contains several express rights and often phrases them in
mandatory ("shall") language.
16 See COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL
RIGHTS, S. EXEc. REP. No. 102-23, at 19 (1992), reproduced in PAUST, VAN DYKE & MALONE, supra
note 15, at 331 ("Mhe United States declares that the provisions of Articles 1 through 27 of the
Covenant are not self-executing.").
17 See Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 2(1)(d) ("'Reservation' means a unilateral statement,
however phrased or named, made by a State, when ... ratifying ... whereby it purports to
exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty.").
Winter 2015
Paust
619
Chicago Journal of International I aw
incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR." Therefore, under a
well-recognized rule regarding putative reservations known as the object and
purpose test, such a declaration is void ab initio as a matter of law." In any event,
there was no attempted reservation to Article 50 of the ICCPR,20 and Article 50
provides in express, self-operative, and unavoidable language that all of "[t]he
provisions of the present Covenant shall extend to all parts of federal States
without any limitations or exceptions." 21
C. The Reach to Non-State Actor Aiders and Abettors
It is also important to note that private actors can have human rights
obligations under the ICCPR. More generally, for at least the last 300 years,
international law has never been merely state-to-state, 22 and, as the U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized in twenty cases, private companies and corporations can
have duties as well as rights under treaty-based and customary international
law,23 including human rights law. 24
The Preamble to the ICCPR expressly affirms "that the individual, having
duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a
responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized
in the present Covenant."" Therefore, at a minimum, individuals have duties not
to violate human rights recognized in the ICCPR. Article 5 also bars "any ...
group or person ... [from engaging] in any activity or [performing] any act
aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms" set forth in the
Covenant "or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided for" in the
18 Seefor example, PAUST, VAN DYKE &MALONE, supra note 15, at 83-84, 87.
19 See Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 19(c); U.N. H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 24,
supra note 11, f1 7, 9, 11-12, 16; PAUST, VAN DYKE & MALONE, supra note 15, at 87; Jordan J.
Paust, Customary International Law and Human Rights Treaties Are Lam of the United States, 20 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 301, 323 (1999).
20 See PAUST, VAN DYKE & MALONE, supra note 15, at 83-84, 87, 590; Paust, supra note 19, at 325-
26.
21 ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 50 (emphasis added).
22 See generally Jordan J. Paust, Nonstate Actor Partiapation in International Law and the Pretense of
Exclusion, 51 VA.J. INT'L L. 977 (2011).
23 See, for example, id. at 986-89.
24 See id at 987-89 n.38; Jordan J. Paust, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 801 (2002). See also infra text accompanying note 28. With respect to the human
right to privacy and non-state actor duties, the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that "[a] most
fundamental human right, that of privacy, is threatened when industrial espionage is condoned or
is made profitable." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974), quoted in Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 155 (1989). See Smith v. Healy, 744 F.
Supp. 2d 1112,1118 (D. Or. 2010).
25 ICCPR, supra note 9, pmbl. (emphasis added).
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Covenant, thereby affirming impliedly the correlative duty of any group or
person not to abrogate or limit those human rights set forth in the ICCPR.26
Significantly, the Human Rights Committee that functions under the auspices of
the ICCPR has affirmed that private persons can have duties under the treaty,27
and it has guaranteed the human right to privacy in particular against
interferences by "State authorities or ... natural or legal persons."28 The reach
of the right to privacy under the 1CCPR to private actors has obvious but largely
untested implications for internet and telephone service providers as well as
those otherwise involved in the transmission, storage, and search of domestic
and international communications, including those operating private
communications satellites.29 Private liability can attach to non-state actor
interferences with a protectable human right to privacy and can also exist where
the private actor is complicit in impermissible interference by a state. Moreover,
direct responsibility of a private actor under human rights law can reach an
impermissible interference with privacy that is not regulated under the Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution when the private actor lacks the necessary
color-of-law connections to the state.
III. PERSONS PROTECTED EXTRATERRITORIALLY
Although relevant human rights law generally has universal reach, a critical
26 Id. art. 5(1). See Paust, supra note 24, at 813, 816 & n.64; see also UDHR, supra note 10, pmbl., arts.
29-30.
27 See, for example, U.N. H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 20, Concerning Violations of Article 7
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 (Oct. 3, 1992), in
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 9 (Vol. 1) (May
27, 2008), at 200-02 (rendering it immaterial "whether [violators act] in their official capacity,
outside their official capacity or in a private capacity"; mandating criminalization of torture and
cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment "whether committed by public officials or other persons
acting on behalf of the State, or by private persons").
28 U.N. H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 16, Article 17 (Right to Privacy), The Right to Respect
of Privacy, Family, Home and Correspondence, and Protection of Honour and Reputation, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1 (Apr. 8, 1988), in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMINTS, supra
note 27, at 191. See also id. at 192 ("States parties are under a duty . . . to provide the legislative
framework prohibiting such acts by natural or legal persons."), 193 (pertaining to "private
individuals and bodies").
29 Regarding significant and widespread private participation in mobile monitoring and mass
surveillance, see Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Prevention of the Right
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, 14-15, 30, 34-35, 40-43, 57, 61, 64-65, 68-70, 73-
76, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/40 (Apr. 17, 2013) (Rapporteur Frank La Rue) (also noting the
problem of "violations of human rights perpetuated by corporate actors") jhereinafter La Rue
Report]; Gus Hosein & Caroline Wilson Palow, Modern Safeguards for Modem Surveillance: An
Analysis on Innovations in Communications Surveillance Techniques, 74 OHIo ST. L.J. 1071, 1080-83, 1086
& n.75, 1089 (2013).
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question remains concerning whether a person situated outside U.S. territory is
protected from an allegedly impermissible human right infringement. Human
rights law is decidedly extraterritorial, but is every person entitled to enjoyment
of a human right in every social context? The answer is that, under most human
rights instruments, only certain persons are entitled to enjoy protection against
state actors when they are situated outside the territory of an alleged state
violator and not otherwise subject its jurisdiction.
For example, with respect to extraterritorial application of the ICCPR, the
critical question is whether an alleged victim is within the jurisdiction, actual
power, or effective control of the state. Article 2 of the ICCPR requires a state
party "to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant." 30 Because
persons within a state's territory are manifestly subject to its jurisdiction-as are
others who are outside of the state's territory but within the equivalent of its
territory under international law or within its occupied territory'-the question
30 ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 2(1). Protections under the Arab, American, and European Human
Rights Conventions and the Rights of the Child Convention also apply to persons when they are
within the "jurisdiction" of the member state. See Arab Charter on Human Rights art. 3(1),
adopted by the League of Arab States, May 22, 2004, reprinted in 12 INT'L. HUM. RTs. REp. 893
(2005) (applying to "all individuals subject to its jurisdiction"); American Convention on Human
Rights art. 1(1), Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Treaty Ser. No. 36, 144 U.N.T.S. 123 (extending to "all
persons subject to their jurisdiction") [hereinafter American Convention]; European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221, Eur. T.S. No. 5, revised by Protocol 11, Eur. T.S. No. 155 (1998) (reaching
"everyone within their jurisdiction") [hereinafter European Convention]; Convention on the
Rights of the Child art. 2, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (protecting "each child within their
jurisdiction"); see also Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, App. No. 55721/07, 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589
(Grand Chamber Judgment), 131-36 (2011), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/
eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -105606 (finding the European Convention applicable where state
authorities carry out official functions in another state's territory (that is, permitted enforcement
jurisdiction) and where "an individual is [physically] taken into the custody of State agents
abroad" and subjected to their control); accord Issa v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 567 (Judgment),
Tf 69-70 (2004), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-67460
(detailing how the Convention applies as a consequence of effective military control over an area);
Bankovid v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, 2001 -XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 333 (Grand Chamber Decision
on Admissibility), Tf 61, 67, 75 (2001), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/
search.aspx?i=001-22099 (finding Article 1 of the European Convention to reflect the "essentially
territorial notion of jurisdiction"; circumscribing the "'effective control' criteria" so as not to
reach everyone "adversely affected by an act imputable to a ... State"); Loizidou v. Turkey, 20
Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (Judgment on Preliminary Objections), T 24 (1995), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -57920 (applying the European
Convention when the state "exercises effective control of an area outside its national territory");
RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 701 ("A state is obligated to respect the human rights of persons
subject to its jurisdiction.").
31 Forms of enforcement jurisdiction under intemational law that are applicable outside the actual
territory of a state include those exercisable on a vessel, aircraft, space craft, satellite, space station
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becomes whether other persons can have human rights protections under the
ICCPR outside of a state's territory as persons "subject to its jurisdiction."" The
Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR has affirmed a widely shared
expectation that those who are outside of a state's territory and included as
persons subject to the state's "jurisdiction" are those who are within the actual
"power or effective control" of the state party.33 There has not been full
that has the state's flag or registry, and territory that the state occupies under the law of
occupation. See, for example, PAUST ET AL., supra note 7, at 196-97, 200, 490; PAUST, VAN DYKE. &
MALONE, supra note 15, at 79, 596 & n.2. Persons on board such vessels and objects or within
occupied territory are decidedly among those subject to the jurisdiction of the state. See Case
Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 1 178 (Dec. 19) (finding a "duty to secure respect for the applicable
rules of international human rights law and international humanitarian law, to protect the
inhabitants of the occupied territory"); id. at %f 179, 206, 219, 345; Legal Consequences of the
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136,
$ 128, 136 (July 9) (holding that Articles 12 and 17 of the ICCPR apply to persons in occupied
territory); see also Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, App. No. 27765/09, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Grand Chamber
Judgment), 180 (Feb. 23), available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4f4507942.pdf; cases
cited supra note 30; U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Res. 1991/67, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1991/91
(Mar. 6) (recognizing Iraq's grave violations of human rights in occupied Kuwait); Van Schaack,
supra note 13, at 35-37.
32 ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 2(1). The phrase "subject to its jurisdiction" is clearly a limiting phrase
and does not allow the ICCPR to reach persons who are merely affected by a state's conduct
abroad.
33 See U.N. H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 31, Nature of the General Legal Oblgation Imposed on
States Parties to the Covenant, 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) (finding
treaty rights applicable "to anyone within the power or effective control of [the] State Party, even
if not situated within the territory of the State" and also to "those within the power or effective
control of the forces of a State Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in
which such power or effective control was obtained"); see also Consequences of a Wall in
Occupied Palestine Territory, Advisory Opinion, supra note 31, 108-11 (the ICCPR "is
applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own
territory"); U.N. H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Report of the United States of
America, 110th Sess., Mar. 10-28, 2014, 1 4(a), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/C04 (Apr. 23, 2014)
(recommending that the U.S. "[i]nterpret the Covenant in good faith, in accordance with the
ordinary meaning to be given to its terms in their context" and "acknowledge the extraterritorial
application of the Covenant under certain circumstances"); U.N. H.R. Comm., Concluding
Observations of the Human Rights Committee, United States of America, 87th Sess., July 10-28, 2006,
10, 16, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev. 1 (Dec. 18, 2006); U.N. H.R. Comm.,
Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee, Israel, 111, U.N. Doc. CCPR/CO/78/ISR
(Aug. 21, 2003) (finding that the ICCPR applied to Israeli conduct in occupied territory); U.N.
H.R. Comm., Delia Saldias de Lopez v. Uruguay, Communication No. 52/1979, T 12(3), U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979, U.N. Doc. A/36/40 (July 29, 1981) (finding the ICCPR
applicable to a Uruguayan kidnaping in Argentina); Coard et al. v. United States, Case No. 10.951,
Report No. 109/99, Annual Report of the Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. (Sept. 29, 1999),
OEA/Ser.L/V/11.106, doc. 6 rev. (1999), 37 (finding the U.S. bound to recognize the rights of
persons "subject to its authority and control"); KAREN DA COSTA, THE EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPIiCATION OF SEI.ECTED HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 40 (2013); MANFRED NOWAK, UN
COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAi. RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 43-44 (2d ed. 2005);
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clarification of who might be within the actual power or effective control of a
state outside its territory or the equivalent of its territory, but a person detained
by the state (for example, by U.S. CIA or military personnel in Germany) would
definitely be covered.
With respect to U.S. eavesdropping and data collection from various
forms of communication, the critical question under the ICCPR becomes
whether a human rights claimant outside of U.S. territory, the equivalent of U.S.
territory, and U.S.-occupied territory, may still be within the actual "power or
effective control" of the U.S. There is no evident test concerning protection
abroad from interference by private actors who do not act with or in support of
a state. Perhaps an analogous test would inquire into whether a privacy claimant
is within the power or effective control of an alleged private perpetrator.
Apparently, very few persons would be covered under such a test. As previously
noted, a person detained by the U.S. would be within its actual power or
effective control and, therefore, protected under the ICCPR, but most who
allege that they are victims of an extraterritorial interference would not be. For
example, a suspected member of al-Qaeda residing in Germany whose cell
phone and computer are under surveillance by the U.S. would not be protected
under the ICCPR-even if the data collected is within the power or effective
control of the U.S.34 Some have suggested that such a person should nonetheless
CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 4, at 930; Anne Peters, Surveillance without Borders: The
Unlawfulness of the NSA Panopticon, Part II, EJIL Talk (Nov. 4, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
surveillance-without-borders-the-unlawfulness-of-the-nsa-panopticon-part-ii (last visited Nov. 18,
2014) ("The state is bound either within its territory or vis-a-vis persons under its 'jurisdiction."').
The Convention Against Torture also applies extraterritorially and covers a particular person
when the person is within the jurisdiction or "effective control" of a State. See PAUST ET AL., safpra
note 7, at 860-61. Regarding the "effective control" and "control and authority" criteria used in
connection with the European Convention, see sources cited supra note 30. Some human rights
instruments do not contain an express limitation to persons subject to a state's jurisdiction. See
discussion supra notes 3, 10 (regarding the UN Charter, which provides a universal reach for
human rights under customary international law, and the UDHR, respectively); see also discussion
infra note 62 (analyzing the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man); Van Schaack,
supra note 13, at 25 (noting that the UDHR does "not contain any jurisdictional limitations at all,
framing its] articulated rights as universally applicable to all persons under all circumstances").
* An interesting new claim has been made that, when data or "communications are intercepted
within [a] State's territory," the State should owe obligations to individual communicators
"regardless of their location" and that the obligation would be "not to interfere with
communications that pass through their territorial borders," especially where interference has
"extra-territorial effects." Carly Nyst, Inteference Based Jurisdiction Over Violations of the Rght to
Privagy, EJIL Talk (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/interference-based-jurisdiction-over-
violations-of-the-right-to-privacy (last visited Nov. 18, 2014). Nonetheless, the ICCPR and most
human rights instruments focus on whether the person is within the jurisdiction of a State, as
supplemented by the "actual power or effective control" test, and not whether data is collected
within its jurisdiction. See ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 2(1). Moreover, questions would arise under
Nyst's approach as to whether communications are interfered with if they are secretly monitored
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be considered within the "virtual" control of the U.S. and that this should
suffice. However, this claim regarding virtual "extraterritorial control over
persons" where actual physical power or effective control of persons is lacking,
while interesting, is new and without support in patterns of generally shared legal
expectations about personal jurisdiction.35 Moreover, what would be controlled
extraterritorially would be communications and data, not persons, and the focus
of the text of Article 2 of the ICCPR is unavoidably on "individuals" who are
within the "jurisdiction" of a state.
The same circumstance is likely to occur with respect to claims
concerning extraterritorial interference by non-state actors. Even in a "virtual"
cyber world, merely viewing or listening to a person will not result in a limitation
on what the person can do or will refrain from doing. There will be no virtual
control of the person. Similarly, if a photographer uses a powerful telephoto lens
to take a picture of a person standing in another country, she will have no
control over the subject. For many who expect that they have a transnational
human right to privacy and private communications in such a circumstance, this
clear lack of extraterritorial protection for persons outside the actual power or
effective control of the monitoring state is merely one of the major forms of a
human rights disconnect. Another disconnect involves the actual human rights
that would be at stake even if an alleged victim is within the actual power or
effective control of the monitoring state (for our purposes, the U.S.).
or collected. A newer claim has been made in a report of the Office of the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights. After rightly noting that "anyone within the power or effective
control" of a party to the ICCPR is covered, the report offers an unsupported sleight-of-hand
assertion: "It follows that ... [a] State's exercise of power or effective control in relation to digital
communications infrastructure ... for example, through direct tapping or penetration of that
infrastructure" engages the State's obligation. Report of the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, The Right of Privag in the DigitalAge, at 11-12, TT 32, 34, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/27/37 (June 30, 2014). While similarly confusing control of data with control of
persons, the report asserts that this duty applies "[eiqually, where the State exercises regulatory
jurisdiction over a third party that physically controls the data." Id. at 12, 134.
35 See Peters, supra note 33 ("The mere surveillance as such does not constitute physica/ control, but it
may (depending on the extent and intensity) constitute virtual control. It is not too far-fetched in
the cyber-age to imagine that this type of control might also trigger the human rights obligation of
the 'virtual' controller.") (emphasis in original); Peter Margulies, The NJA in Global Perspective:
Surveillance, Human Rights, and International Counterterrorism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137 (2014)
(preferring a "virtual control" test).
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IV. THE RELATIVE HUMAN RIGHT TO
PRIVATE COMMUNICATION
A. "Arbitrary" or "Unlawful"
The human right to private communication is not absolute. 6 For example,
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) declares that
"[njo one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence."" Necessarily, one has to be subjected to an
"interference" and, under the UDHR, the interference must be arbitrary before
there can be an impermissible infringement of the right. The ICCPR also uses
the arbitrary interference test, but it adds an alternative standard regarding an
impermissible interference-an interference is also impermissible when it is
"unlawful." As noted in Article 17 of the ICCPR, a person "shall [not] be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence."38
36 See U.N. H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 16, supra note 28, 7 ("As all persons live in
society, the protection of privacy is necessarily relative."); Peters, supra note 33 ("The right to
privacy is not absolute. It may be lawfully restricted; it is violated only if the restrictions are not
justified."); La Rue Report, supra note 29, at 1 21 ("As the right to privacy is a qualified right, its
interpretation raises challenges with respect to what constitutes the private sphere and in
establishing notions of what constitutes public interest."). More generally, the legal meaning of a
treaty-based or customary norm will have as its core a generally shared expectation or opiniojuris
that can expand or contract over time. See discussion infra notes 46, 114.
37 UDHR, supra note 10, art. 12. The UDHR mentions the Charter-based duty of all UN members
to promote "universal respect for and observance of human rights." Id. pmbl. The UDHR also
states that "every individual and every organ of society ... shall strive . . . to secure their
universal ... observance ... among the peoples of Member States themselves and among the
peoples of territories under their jurisdiction." Id. The phrase "peoples of territories under their
jurisdiction" might be a limiting phrase regarding contemplated extraterritorial state duties, but
this is not clear. The UDHR adds that there should be "no distinction ... on the basis of the ...
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a person belongs." Id. art.
2. These two phrases in conjunction might suggest the existence of an implied limitation to
persons under a state's "jurisdiction," but this is not certain. If such a limitation does not exist, all
persons in any location can have relevant protections, and the questions become: what are the
types of protection under the UDHR, and what are the limits to relevant rights that appear in its
Article 29? See discussion infra note 57. In any event, the UDHR is not technically binding like an
international agreement, and what becomes most important is not whether it contains an implied
imitation regarding jurisdiction, but whether rights and limitations reflected in it have become
part of customary international law that is universally applicable through Articles 55(c) and 56 of
the UN Charter. See discussion supra note 3.
38 ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 17(1). The "arbitrary or unlawful" standard is also used in the Arab
Charter on Human Rights, supra note 30, art. 21(1), and in the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, suqpra note 30, art. 16(1). The American Convention on Human Rights uses the "arbitrary or
abusive" standard. American Convention, supra note 30, art. 11(2). The UDHR uses merely the
"arbitrary" standard. UDHR, supra note 10, art. 12. Only the European Convention uses the
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Under either substantive legal standard, three questions arise: (1) does the
person have a protectable privacy interest; (2) if so, has there been an
interference with it; and (3) is the interference permissible in view of substantive
standards or limitations? The first two questions will be addressed in this
subsection in reverse order, and the third question will be addressed in detail in
the next subsection. With respect to the second question, a choice must be made
regarding what constitutes subjection of a person to an interference. For
example, will secret governmental eavesdropping, data collection, or data mining
constitute an interference with one or more of the four relational, spatial, and
physical categories of "privacy, family, home or correspondence"? If data
collection and data mining remain secret and produce no known impact on a
person, some might conclude that the person has not been subjected to an
interference. However, others might conclude that even secret governmental
awareness of information within the ambit of one's privacy interest constitutes
an interference. This is the approach of the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR), which has recognized that interception and subsequent storage of a
telephone, facsimile, or email communication will constitute an "interference"
with "private life" and "correspondence," whether or not the communicator has
been "inconvenienced."" In such cases, societal expectations answer the
manifestly more stringent standard of "necessity" with respect to limitations of the right to
privacy. See European Convention, supra note 30, art. 8(2).
3 See, for example, Nyst, supra note 34, citing three cases set forth below with relevant quotations:
Malone v. United Kingdom, 7 Eur. H.R. Rep. 14 (Judgment), 1 64 (1984), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57533 ("jT]he existence ... of
laws and practices which permit and establish a system for effectuating secret surveillance of
communications amounted in itself to an 'interference ... with the exercise' of the applicant's
rights . . ., apart from any measures actually taken against him . . . Weber and Saravia v.
Germany, 46 Eur. H.R. Rep. SE5 (Decision on Admissibility), 78 (2006), available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -76586 ("[A]pplicants ... were un-
able to demonstrate that the impugned measures had actually been applied to them....
[-lowever, . . . the mere existence of legislation which allows a system for the secret monitoring
of communications entails a threat of surveillance for all those to whom the legislation may be
applied. This threat ... amounts in itself to an interference . . . ."); accord Kennedy v. United
Kingdom, 52 Eur. H.R. Rep. 4 (Judgment), 118 (2010), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -98473. That an interference with a recognized privacy interest
occurs does not require a conclusion that the interference is arbitrary or otherwise impermissible.
See discussion infra notes 101-102. Although using the rare and restrictive limitations on the right
to privacy found in Article 8(2) of the European Convention, the Court in Malone found that
domestic law did "not indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of exercise of the
relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities. To that extent, the minimum degree of
legal protection to which citizens are entitled under the rule of law in a democratic society is
lacking." Malone v. United Kingdom, supra, 179. Moreover, "the resultant interference can only
be regarded as 'necessary in a democratic society' if the particular system of secret surveillance
adopted contains adequate guarantees against abuse." Id. 81 (internal citation omitted). See also
discussion and sources cited infra note 102.
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question whether there is an interference as well as the first question (in other
words, whether a privacy interest exists or is at stake). A third question
remains-that is, whether an interference is permissible. As noted in Section
IV.C, generally shared legal expectations regarding proper interpretation of
relevant normative standards and limitations answer this question.
With respect to the first question posed-whether a person has a
protectable privacy interest-a contextually-grounded choice will have to be
made about whether privacy exists or is at stake in a given context. For example,
under U.S. constitutional law (which is useful by analogy but not determinative),
courts often inquire whether a person has a "reasonable expectation of privacy"
in a given circumstance before concluding that "privacy" exists or is at stake.40 If
a person places garbage out near the street where others can access it, courts
have ruled that privacy does not obtain.41 if a person mails a postcard with a
clear written message on the back, courts usually find that the writer did not
have a reasonable expectation of privacy and that the message was a public
one.42 The opposite conclusion is predictable when a person places the message
in a sealed non-see-through envelope for mailing. As the Human Rights
Committee under the ICCPR has noted with respect to "the integrity and
confidentiality of correspondence,... [c]orrespondence should be delivered to
the addressee without interception and without being opened or otherwise
read."43 Whether messages sent via email, texting, or otherwise through the
internet are like those on the back of a postcard, those within a sealed envelope,
40 See, for example, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[There is
a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
'reasonable.' Thus a man's home is, for most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but
objects, activities, or statements that he exposes to the 'plain view' of outsiders are not 'protected'
because no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited."). Although the U.S.
Constitution generally constrains government action abroad, the Fourth Amendment applies
abroad merely to the people of the U.S. and does not confer protections from unreasonable
searches on aliens. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 260 (1990).
41 See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-41 (1988) (regarding "garbage bags left at the curb
outside" of a home, a warrantless search "would violate the Fourth Amendment only if
respondents manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as
objectively reasonable," and where they "exposed their garbage to the public" with "the express
purpose of conveying it to a third party, the trash collector," there was no violation of a privacy
interest, especially when "[i]t is common knowledge that plastic garbage bags left on or at the side
of a public street are readily accessible" by others).
42 See U.S. v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1983); see also United States v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 951-
52 (2012) (holding that a reasonable expectation of privacy does not exist when information has
"been voluntarily conveyed to the public"). However, the Court's use of the word "voluntarily"
raises a question whether the claimant's volition should control or is merely an aspect of the
particular context to be addressed. See discussion infra note 45.
43 U.N. H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 16, supra note 28, 8.
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or those in some context in between can depend on ease of public access,
general awareness of actual and potential access, and generally shared
expectations about the reasonableness of a communicator's claimed expectation
of privacy.
U.S. constitutional law since KatZ tracks logic in prescribing two elements
for determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists: (1) whether
there is an expectation of privacy, and (2) whether the expectation is reasonable.
Presumably one should try to identify whether a relevant expectation is generally
shared in society as opposed to whether merely the claimant has an expectation
of privacy, although the claimant's expectation would not be irrelevant." For
example, if a claimant has no expectation of privacy when mailing a message on
a postcard, it would be proper to conclude that the claimant's privacy is not at
stake, especially when society in general would have no expectation of privacy in
such a circumstance.4 5 Conversely, if the claimant expects that a message on the
back of a postcard is private, it would still be proper to conclude that the
claimant's privacy is not at stake, either because of generally shared expectations
or, perhaps ultimately, because the claimant's personal expectation is not
reasonable. In either circumstance, the individual's expectation could be of some
relevance but would not be determinative. With respect to the normative
conclusion whether something is reasonable, it is clear that a given community's
SSee, for example, Andrew D. Selbst, Contextual Expectations of Privacy, 35 CARDOZO L. REv. 643, 646,
649, 655 (2013) (addressing a preferred focus on "society's reasonable expectations of privacy,"
arguing that the 'reasonable expectation of privacy' test" under the Fourth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution should have "grounding" in contextual awareness of "how people in society
actually experience privacy," and looking to "society's actual expectations of privacy"). Selbst
rightly criticizes simplistic and "sweeping" use of the "third-party doctrine" in order to obviate
privacy interests if information is disclosed merely to some persons but has purposely not been
disclosed to "the world," because there should be fuller consideration of context and generally
shared expectations about privacy. See id at 656, 658 (regarding problems posed by use of the
internet), 673 (adding that this danger is "more apparent today, as society relies on digital
communications in which every action is transmitted to third-party Internet service providers,
search engines, email servers, and others"), 707 ("If third-party doctrine continues as is, email,
text messages, any documents stored online-basically any digital communication-will be
outside the purview of the Fourth Amendment . . ."); see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735,
749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Those who disclose certain facts to a bank or phone
company for a limited business purpose need not assume that this information will be released to
other persons for other purposes."); but see discussion infra text accompanying note 92.
45 See Lustiger v. United States, 386 F.2d 132, 139 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968)
("[Flirst class mail cannot be seized and retained, nor opened and searched, without the authority
of a search warrant.... However, the Fourth Amendment does not preclude postal inspectors
from copying information contained on the outside of sealed envelopes in the mail, where no
substantial delay in the delivery of the mail is involved.") (internal citations omitted); Canaday v.
United States, 354 F.2d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding that "recordation of information
contained on the outside of first-class envelopes, such as the name and address of sender and
addressee," did not violate the Fourth Amendment).
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generally shared expectations are the proper standard,46 although other
international legal precepts and policies at stake might allow decision makers to
conclude that a given intrusion is not "reasonable" despite general social
acceptance of such a form of intrusion. Such might be the conclusion, for
example, if the intrusion operated merely against a religious minority, but it
might be intellectually more appropriate to conclude in such a circumstance that
the intrusion was generally reasonable but impermissible because of
unacceptable religious-based discrimination.
An interesting dynamic with respect to privacy on the internet and in other
methods of communication involves the increasing public awareness of hacking,
eavesdropping, data collection, and data storage by public and private actors. For
example, the more the public learns about widespread U.S. and other
governmental intrusions, the more compelling the conclusion that a given
privacy interest is not at stake and that a communicator's expectation of privacy
is unreasonable. Yet it is theoretically possible that such a change in expectations
about privacy could move serially such that, at one stage, public awareness of
actual and potential invasions exists, but the public generally expects that the
intrusions are unreasonable or that privacy is being violated. In such a
circumstance, society would not expect that internet and phone communications
are always private but would still have the normative expectation that
widespread governmental hacking, eavesdropping, collection, and storage is an
impermissible (because unreasonable) interference with a privacy interest.47 This
is undoubtedly the view of the European Parliament.4 Governments may also
46 See, for example, Selbst, supra note 44, at 650 (arguing that "the normative layer evaluates whether
the new information flows being tested are preferable," and "[a]ppropriateness" is tied to a type
of "social norm" termed a "'context-relative informational norm"' regarding "how information is
expected to flow among social actors within a given social context"), 701 (quoting Justice Kagan
in Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring), for the proposition that
"our 'shared social expectations"' should determine "what places should be free form
governmental incursions" (internal citations omitted)). With respect to normative content of
international law, patterns of shared expectations regarding content (or opiniojuris) and objective,
generally shared, or "ordinary" meaning also comprise the proper standard, and a core of
generally shared meaning or opiniojuris can expand or contract over time and exclude logically
possible meanings from present legal protection. See Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31(1);
PAUST, VAN DYKE & MALONE, supra note 15, at 4-5, 29-30, 49, 69, 93-94, 105-07; Jordan J.
Paust, Basic Forms of International Law and Alonist, Dualist, and Realist Perspectives, in BASIC CONCEPTS
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL. LAW: MONISM & DUALISM 244, 253-59 (Marko Novakovic ed., 2013).
47 Some claim that there is still a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding use of the internet. See
Susan W. Brenner, Fourth Amendment Future: Remote Computer Searches and the Use of Virtual Force, 81
Miss. L.J. 1229, 1239 (2012); Hosein & Palow, supra note 29, at 1093-95; see also La Rue Report,
supra note 29, T 21 (quoted snpra in note 36); infra text accompanying note 91.
48 See, for example, European Parliament, Draft Report on the U.S. NSA Surveillance Programme,
Surveillance Bodies in Various States and Their Impact on EU Citizen's Fundamental Rghts and on
Transatlantic Cooperation in justice and Home Affairs, 2013/2188(INI) (Rapporteur Claude Moraes
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be aware that their communications and data are increasingly subject to various
forms of espionage but continue to expect that espionage is unlawful under
domestic law. Therefore, mere awareness of the existence of invasions will not
be determinative regarding whether a protectable interest exists or an
interference is reasonable. Yet at a certain point, use of email, texting, and cell
phones could be considered analogous to use of a postcard to send messages. A
notable change in patterns of expectation has already occurred with respect to
search of people and luggage on common carriers.49
B. Relevant Limitations on Freedom of Communication
1. Under the ICCPR.
Finally, if a person has been subjected to an interference with a protectable
interest in privacy or private correspondence, courts and institutions must ask
whether there are applicable limitations to enjoyment of the right. For example,
even when there is an interference with a recognized privacy interest, whether or
not it is permissible under human rights law can depend on proper application
of the word "arbitrary" or, as noted regarding the ICCPR, the word "unlawful."
The ostensibly permissive requirement that an interference not be "arbitrary"
can result in a significant and potentially far-reaching limitation on one's privacy
and freedom of correspondence. Importantly, the word "unlawful" provides a
separate protection because a non-arbitrary interference would still be
proscribed under the ICCPR if unlawful within the meaning of Article 17-a
MEP), Dec. 23, 2013, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML%2BCOMPARL%2BPE-526.085%2BO2%2BDOC%2BPDF%2BV0//EN
[hereinafter Eur. Par. Draft]. President Obama has recognized that "all persons have legitimate
privacy interests in the handling of their personal information," and U.S. intelligence activities
"must, therefore, include appropriate safeguards for [| personal information ... regardless of...
where [a monitored] individual resides." Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 1, pmbl., 5 4. Yet
there is no elaboration of what privacy interests are "legitimate," how interests must be taken
"into account," and what might not be "appropriate" as a safeguard. See also discussion infra note
82. It also states that "persons should be treated with dignity and respect" (Presidential Policy
Directive, supra note 1, pmbl., 5 4), but most persons abroad will not be "treated" because they
will not be detainees.
49 See, for example, Electronic Privacy Information Center v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Security, 653
F.3d I (D.C. Cit. 2011) (upholding TSA search with advanced imaging technology at an airport);
United States v. Aukai, 497 F.3d 955, 962 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding the same TSA search);
MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cit. 2006) (upholding random suspicionless subway baggage
searches to prevent terrorism); Torbet v. United Airlines, Inc., 298 F.3d 1087 (9th Cit. 2002)
(finding implied consent to search when a bag is placed on x-ray conveyor belt at an airport);
American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority, No. 04-
11652-GAO, WL1682859 (D. Mass. July 28, 2004) (search at a train); see also United States v.
Edwards, 498 F.2d 496, 499-500 (2d Cir. 1974) (showing how luggage and sealed envelopes were
previously given the same treatment).
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determination presumably depending on the content, reach, and proper
consideration of relevant domestic, regional, and international law." In fact,
relevant international law is a necessary background for proper interpretation of
any treaty." The Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR has added, "[t]he
term 'unlawful' means that no interference can take place except in cases
envisaged by the law. . . [and] on the basis of law, which itself must comply with
the provisions, aims and objectives of the Covenant."52 More particularly, "[t]he
gathering and holding of personal information on computers, data banks and
other devices, whether by public authorities or private individuals or bodies,
must be regulated by law." 53
Determining whether an intrusion is arbitrary under human rights law
evokes the standard of reasonableness noted above because an intrusion would
not be arbitrary if it is rational and reasonable in a given context.54 Some prefer
50 See, for example, Weber and Saravia v. Germany, supra note 39, 87 ("[mhe term 'law' within the
meaning of ... [Article 8 of the ECHR] refers back to national law, including rules of public
international law applicable in the State concerned."); NOWAK, supra note 33, at 382 (arguing that
it "primarily refers to violations of . .. domestic laws, [but] it might also be interpreted to cover
violations of international" law); Peters, supra note 33 ("Ihe word 'unlawful' should be
interpreted expansively so as to include not only unlawfulness under domestic law but also
unlawfulness under international law. The modern approach to expressions such as these is to
construe them autonomously, that is, not as pure renvois to domestic law, in order to contribute to
a universal understanding of the treaty provision."). These laws might conflict in a given
circumstance. For example, if surveillance is lawful under domestic law, it might be unlawful
under regional or international law other than the human rights law contained in the ICCPR.
Conversely, it might be unlawful under certain domestic law but permissible under international
law. See infra Section IV.C.2.
51 See, for example, Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31(3)(c) ("There shall be taken into
account . . . any relevant rules of international law.").
52 H.R. Comm., General Comment No. 16, supra note 28, at 191.
53 Id. at 193. See discussion infra note 108 (focusing on domestic law of the state engaged in
surveillance).
54 See H.R. Comm. General Comment No. 16, supra note 28, at 191, T 4 (interpreting Article 17 of
the ICCPR "to guarantee that even interference provided for by law ... should be[,] . . . in any
event, reasonable in the particular circumstances") (emphasis added); H.R. Comm., Canepa v.
Canada, Comm. No. 558/1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993, T 11.4 (June 20, 1997)
("[Airbitrariness ... extends to the reasonableness of the interference with the person's rights
under Article 17 and its compatibility with the purposes, aims and objectives of the Covenant.");
Gretel Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica, Case No. 12.361, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No.
85/10, 88 (2011) (holding conduct abusive or arbitrary if it is unreasonable); NOWAK, supra note
33, at 383 (arguing that the term "arbitrary" is related to "elements of injustice, unpredictability
and unreasonableness" and that, "[i]n evaluating whether interference with privacy by a State ...
represents a violation," one must review "whether it was reasonable (proportional) in relation to
the purpose to be achieved"). More generally, conduct can be arbitrary if it is irrational, without
reason, capricious, or not reasonable-that is, "not flawed by arbitrariness or otherwise manifestly
unreasonable." Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Portugal, App. No. 73049/01, (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 11,
2007) (Judgment), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
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to add a requirement that an intrusion must be proportionate to a reasonable
need." This might be useful, but, when gauging whether a particular
governmental intrusion is arbitrary, attending to the many features of actual
context would seem to entail adequate consideration of proportionality.
In any event, what is or is not arbitrary, rational, or reasonable should be
determined with reference to context as well as other relevant precepts, rights,
and policies at stake. Among those identified in the UDHR are the human tight
of all persons to "dignity and worth";" limitations of rights that are "determined
by law" and are "solely for the purpose of' "securing due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of others";" and limitations that are
"determined by law" and are "solely for the purpose of" "meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society."" Clearly, concern for dignity of the person can pull one way while
78981; see Murphy v. Ireland, 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R., 1, 20-25 (addressing the "necessary in a
democratic society" test of the European Convention regarding restrictions on speech, finding
that the limitation at issue "reflects a reasonable distinction made by the State," and holding "jin
the circumstances, . . . that the State has demonstrated that there were 'relevant and sufficient'
reasons justifying the interference"); Peters, supra note 33 ("[T]he proper, generally acknowledged
test for determining the admissibility of a human rights restriction is the following: there must be
a basis in law, the governmental measures must pursue a legitimate aim, and they must be
proportionate. When these conditions are not satisfied, interference with privacy or correspondence
is 'unlawful or arbitrary."') (emphasis added). The standard is not a necessity standard, which only
the European Convention employs. See European Convention, supra note 30, art. 8(2) (requiring
limitations be "necessary in a democratic society"); supra text accompanying note 38; La Rue
Report, supra note 29, 3, 28-29, 81, 83(b); but see Nyst, supra note 34 ("I would argue that mass
or indiscriminate surveillance is arbitrary, as it doesn't apply the principles of necessity and
proportionality required under international law."). Moreover, an intrusion that is not necessary
can still be rational, reasonable, and non-arbitrary. Nonetheless, there are other [imitations to
other rights that have been phrased in terms of "requirements" and what is "necessary." See infra
text accompanying notes 61, 76; see also European Convention, supra note 30, art. 8(2) (proscribing
interference with privacy "except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a
democratic society" for the serving of certain listed purposes, including "the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others"); supra note 39.
ss See, for example, Nyst, supra note 34; Peters, supra note 33; La Rue Report, supra note 29, 1 3, 28,
29(f, 83(c).
56 UDHR, supra note 10, pmbl., art. 1.
s7 Id. art. 29 ("In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality,
public order and the general welfare in a democratic society."). Concerning accommodation of the
rights of others, see African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights ("Banjul Charter") art. 27(2),
June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (1982) ("The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be
exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common
interest."); European Convention, supra note 30, art. 8(2); infra text accompanying notes 59, 68;
infra text accompanying notes 72, 79(concerning Article 32(2) of the American Convention).
58 UDHR, supra note 10, art. 1.
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concern for the dignity and rights of others and for public order can pull the
other way. Phrases such as "due recognition" and "just requirements" pose
additional problems concerning interpretation and application in a given context.
What is due or just should be decided with reference to generally shared
expectations about the content of these concepts, their relation to various other
rights and policies at stake, and their application in particular circumstances."
Article 19 of the ICCPR recognizes a relevant human right to freedom of
expression and affirms that "this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his
choice.""0 Some forms of governmental surveillance, in addition to constituting
an intrusion of privacy, can have an understandable chilling effect on freedom of
expression and access to information. However, the subsequent paragraph of
Article 19 states that exercise of the rights set forth is subject to "special duties
and responsibilities" of the rights claimant and also recognizes forms of
limitation that can apply if they are "provided by law and are necessary (a) [f]or
respect of the rights or reputations of others; [or] (b) [f]or the protection of
national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.""
2. Under the American Declaration.
Within the Americas, the United States is also bound to comply with the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (American
Declaration),62 which provides authoritative content to the human rights
59 See MCDOUGAL, LAssWIEI.L & CHlN, supra note 3, at 119, 459, 800, 805-07 (regarding the need for
accommodation of different rights and interests); 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 10,
1121 ("[A]ll human rights are universal, indivisible, interrelated, interdependent and mutually
reinforcing."); supra text accompanying notes 46, 57 (regarding opiniojuis and normative meaning);
infra text accompanying notes 68-72, 79 (regarding proper accommodation of rights of others and
correlative duties of states).
60 ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 19(2). In a given circumstance, surveillance can be abused in an effort to
deny the right to freedom of expression, especially in non-democratic societies. See, for exaiple, La
Rue Report, supra note 29, 24-27, 69; Eur. Par. Draft, supra note 48, IT 74-75.
61 ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 19(3). Relevant rights of others can include the right to "security of
person" against terrorist harm. See id. art. 9(1) ("Everyone has the right to liberty and security of
person."); see also discussion infra notes 69, 70.
62 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, O.A.S. Off. Rec.
OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4Rev. (1965) [hereinafter American Declaration]. Unlike many human rights
instruments, the American Declaration's reach is not limited by phrases such as "persons subject
to its jurisdiction." See Alejandre et al. v. Cuba, Case No. 11.589, Annual Report of the Inter-Am.
Comm. H.R. (Sept. 29, 1999) (applying the American Declaration to the Cuban downing of
aircraft over the high seas); NIi.s MELZER, TARGETED KiLLINGS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 125-28
(2008) (asserting that the American Declaration "does not contain a jurisdiction clause" and has
been applied abroad to more than just conduct occurring in occupied territory or the killing of
individuals by state actors). In the absence of this limitation, the question becomes, what rights
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guaranteed under the Charter of the Organization of American States." Among
relevant rights that are set forth in the American Declaration are the right of
every person to "freedom ... of the expression and dissemination of ideas, by
any medium whatsoever"; 64 "the right to the inviolability of his home";6 1 "the
right to the inviolability and transmission of his correspondence";66 and "the
right to protection of the law against abusive attacks upon . . . his private and
family life."6 Yet "[t]he rights of man are limited by the rights of others, by the
security of all, and by the just demands of the general welfare and the
are covered in the American Declaration and what limitations of rights pertain? Although the
European Convention is also a regional human rights instrument, it has recognizably bound
European parties and their nationals outside of Europe. See, for example, Al-Skeini v. United
Kingdom, supra note 30. This supports the argument that the American Declaration will apply to
conduct of American states and their nationals outside of the American region. However, the
American Declaration only has ultimate legal force through the Charter of the Organization of
American States, which is focused on the region. See discussion infra note 63.
63 Charter of the Organization of American States, arts. 3(k)-(1), signed April 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S.
3, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2631 (addressing common welfare for "the peoples of the
continent," and proclaiming "fundamental rights of the individual") (citations to various
subsequent Charter amendments omitted); see also id. arts. 17, 45 (mandating that "the State shall
respect the rights of the individual"; addressing a "just social order" and a "right to material well-
being ... under circumstances of liberty, dignity, equality of opportunity, and economic security"
in connection with principles related to "international social justice" and "integral development
for their peoples" pledged in Article 30). Regarding authoritative use of the American Declaration
through the O.A.S. Charter, see Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, I-A. Inter-Am. Court H.R., Ser. A,
No. 10, 45 (1989); Inter-American Comm. on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of the
Inhabitants of the Interior of Ecuador Affected by Development Activities, Chapter VII (1996),
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, doc. 10, rev. 1 (April 24, 1997) ("The American
Declaration ... continues to serve as a source of international obligation for all member
states.... "); The "Baby Boy" Opinion, Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. 25,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1981), 16 ("As a consequence of Articles 3i, 16, 51e, 112
and 150 of [a prior version of the OAS Charter], the provisions of other instruments and
resolutions of the OAS on human rights acquired binding force."). Documents of the O.A.S. on
human rights that have been approved by a vote in U.S. Congress include the American
Declaration, which affirms several human rights now protected through the O.A.S. Charter,
including the right to "resort to the courts to ensure respect for [one's] legal rights." American
Declaration, art. XVIII; see also Roach Case, No. 9647, Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. 147,
OEA/Ser.L/V/11.71, doc. 9 rev. 1 (1987),l 48; BUIERGENTHAIL, SHFILTON & STEWART, supra note
3, at 227-28; RICHARD B. LiLLICH & HURST HANNUM, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 802-04
(3d ed. 1995); McDOUGAL, LASSWELL & CHEN, supra note 3, at 198, 316; PAUST, VAN DYKE &
MALONE, supra note 15, at 437-38; DAVID WUISSBRODT, JOAN FITZPATRICK & FRANK NEWMAN,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 598-600 (3d ed. 1996).
64 American Declaration, supra note 62, art. IV.
65 Id. art. IX.
66 Id. art. X. Regardless of whether it can include phone conversations, the word correspondence
clearly can include transmission of email and text messages. In any event, phone conversations
can be part of private life if there is a protectable privacy interest at stake with respect to
particular conversations.
67 Id. art. V.
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advancement of democracy." 8
Although "freedom" and "inviolability" are potentially bedrocks of privacy
in one's home and private communication, the recognition that "private and
family life" are protected from "abusive attacks" suggests that the phrase
"abusive attacks" is a limitation and that non-abusive interferences with private
and family life can be tolerated. In any event, broad limitations of documented
rights can pertain regarding (1) "the rights of others" and (2) "the security of
all," and they provide two significant bases for justifying national security
intrusions on privacy and private communications. With respect to proper
accommodation of the rights of others, it is important to recognize that "the
security of all" and the right of each person to "security of . . . person"
contained in the American Declaration6 9 and in several other human rights
instruments, can be served through permissible measures of national security
protection." Indeed, a single-minded emphasis on the human rights of the
privacy claimant could lead to inadequate consideration of potentially conflicting
human rights of others, including the human rights of others to dignity and
personal security and the correlative duties of states to seek to achieve personal
security for all who are within their jurisdiction.72
3. Under the American Convention.
The United States has not ratified the American Convention, but
because President Carter signed the treaty on July 1, 1977 and the signature has
68 Id. art. XXVIII.
69 Id. art. 1. Personal and national security can obviously be violated or threatened by state and non-
state actor terrorism, armed attacks, and warfare. Such conduct would also threaten general
welfare and the advancement of democracy, which are relevant to limitations under Article
XXVIII.
70 Seeforexample, ICCPR, supra note 9, art. 9(1); UDHR, supra note 10, art. 3; American Convention,
supra note 30, art. 7(1); European Convention, supra note 30, art. 5(1).
71 See supra text accompanying note 57.
72 See Human Rights and Terrorism, U.N. G.A. Res. 59/195, pmbl., T 13 (Dec. 20, 2004) (expressing
serious concern "about the gross violations of human rights perpetrated by terrorist groups," and
stressing "that every person . . . has a right to protection from terrorism and terrorist acts,"
respectively); Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (Judgment), 149 (1978),
available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i =001 -57506 (stating in dictum
that "terrorist activities ... of individuals or of groups ... are in clear disregard of human rights").
Aliens within a state's jurisdiction are also entitled to personal security. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 3, § 711, cmts. a, b, c, e, RN 2 (regarding "denial of justice" to aliens through a failure to
adequately protect aliens from violence). Many reports and court opinions pay no express
attention to others' individual human rights, especially the right to personal security. See, for
example, La Rue Report, supra note 29 (noting the potentially interconnected right to freedom of
speech but not mentioning the right to personal security); Eur. Par. Draft, supra note 48; H. R.
Comm., Concluding Observations on the Fourth Report ofthe United States ofAmerica, supra note 33, 22.
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not been withdrawn," the United States is bound under international law to take
no action inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treaty.74 Clearly, the
object and purpose of a human rights treaty are to assure the guarantee and
effectuation of the rights set forth in the treaty.
Under the American Convention the right to privacy, including private life
and correspondence, is merely protected against "arbitrary or abusive
interference";7 ' and the right to freedom of expression is "subject to subsequent
imposition of liability . . expressly established by law to the extent necessary in
order to ensure: (a) respect for the rights or reputations of others, or (b) the
protection of national security, public order, or public health or morals."
However, "[t]he right of expression may not be restricted by indirect methods or
means, such as the abuse of government or private controls, . . . or by any other
means tending to impede the communication and circulation of ideas and
opinions." 7 Moreover, the American Convention provides a set of limitations
with respect to interpretation of any of its provisions and, therefore, a potential
set of limitations of any of the limitations of right." Importantly, the American
Convention also recognizes that "[t]he rights of each person are limited by the
rights of others, by the security of all, and by the just demands of the general
welfare, in a democratic society.""
73 See BUERGENTHAL, SHELTON & STEWART, supra note 3 at 242, 358.
74 See Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 18(a) ("A State is obligated to refrain from any acts
which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when . . . (a) [ilt has signed the treaty ...
subject to ratification ... until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the
treaty ... ).
7 American Convention, supra note 30, art. 11(2). But see Tristan Donoso v. Panami, 2009 Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193, 56 (Jan. 27, 2009) (confusing different standards of "arbitrary or
abusive" (which are the standards in Article 11(2) of the Convention) and necessary: "the right to
privacy ... may be restricted by the States provided that interference is not abusive or arbitrary;
accordingly, such restriction must be statutorily enacted, serve a legitimate purpose, and meet the
requirements of suitability, necessity, and proportionality which render it necessary in a
democratic society"). The American Convention identifies an "intention to consolidate in this
hemisphere . . . a system of personal liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential
rights of man." Id. pmbl.
76 Id. art. 13(2).
n Id. art. 13(3).
78 See id. art. 29 (b)(c)(d) ("No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as .. . (b) restricting
the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State
Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; (c) precluding
other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from
representative democracy as a form of government; or (d) excluding or limiting the effect that the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same
nature may have."). Subsections (b) and (d), then, make domestic and international law relevant to
interpretation of the American Convention.
7 Id. art. 32(2).
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C. Application in Context
1. Arbitrary.
As noted, what is rational, reasonable, and non-arbitrary must be
considered in context, and a choice must be made regarding accommodation of
potentially competing interests and rights. Concerning widespread and
systematic surveillance, Professor Anne Peters has suggested:
the impugned measure's objective must be legitimate and the restriction
must be proportionate. The policy of combating terrorism and transnational
crime is surely a legitimate objective. But the third condition [i.e.,
proportionality] does not seem to be fulfilled in the case of large-scale and
systematic surveillance. It is of course difficult to assess the proportionality
of a governmental measure in the absence of a thorough knowledge of the
facts. However, dragnet searches and stock data retention of the entire
population or large groups without concrete indications founding a
suspicion that terrorist or criminal acts are being planned seems prima facie
disproportionate and unnecessary.80
Her points are generally apt, even if one disagrees with her conclusion about
prima facie aspects of such forms of surveillance. In a given circumstance,
widespread and systematic surveillance and data collection can be rational and
reasonably needed in order to counter future terrorist threats and for purposes
of national security more generally. Additionally, the test with respect to
arbitrariness is not a necessity test or one that disallows interferences that are
unnecessary, but one related to what is rational and reasonable in a given
circumstance.
a Peters, supra note 33. See Eur. Par. Draft, supra note 48, 9, 10 (condemning "in the strongest
possible terms the vast, systematic, blanket collection of the personal data of innocent people,"
which "constitute[s] a serious interference" with fundamental rights, and noting that the German
Federal Constitutional Court prohibited "preventive dragnets ... unless there is proof of a
concrete danger," respectively); Hosein & Palow, supra note 29, at 1103 (claiming that with respect
to "mass surveillance . . . it is hard to see how it could [constitute a] reasonable [search]," and
"courts should tread carefully when considering whether national security is a sufficient
justification" under the U.S. Fourth Amendment); G. Alex Sinha, NSA Surveillance Since 9/11 and
the Human Right to Privacy, 59 Loy. L. Ri.v. 861, 861, 941 (2013) ("'lhere is good reason to think
that the program violates the covenant"; "massive, deliberate collection ... [is] strongly suggestive
of arbitrariness.").
i See discussion supra note 54. But see La Rue Report, supra note 29, 28-29 (stating that Article 17
"enables necessary, legitimate and proportional restrictions" and recommending a change in
Article 17's test), 81 (claiming contrary to the text of Article 17 that "surveillance of
communications must only occur under the most exceptional circumstances"), 83(b)
(recommending a change in the relevant legal standard from arbitrary to "strictly and
demonstrably necessary to achieve a legitimate aim"); H.R. Comm., Concluding Observations on the
Fourth Report of the United States ofAmeica, supra note 33, 22(a) (claiming, contrary to the express
language in Article 17 of the 1CCPR and the Human Rights Committee's General Comment No.
16, that obligations under the ICCPR require that "measures should be taken to ensure that any
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For example, in the absence of known intelligence pointing to the existence
of an actual plot, would it be arbitrary for the U.S. to engage in widespread
collection and data mining of information on suspicion of a secret terrorist plot
in Germany to kill President Obama on his next scheduled visit to the country?
It seems that such data collection and mining can be rational and reasonable and
at least would not be prima facie arbitrary within the meaning of the ICCPR. It
would appear to be rational and reasonable in view of the significant national
security interest at stake in protecting President Obama during his visit. Keeping
in mind the right to personal security to which all persons within U.S.
jurisdiction are entitled, nonspecific knowledge of a possible terrorist plot would
make the same systematized collection of information even more rational,
reasonable, and non-arbitrary.82
There was clearly widespread Russian surveillance of communications
coming into and emanating from Sochi during the 2014 Winter Olympics, and it
was recognizably reasonable in view of a number of publicized terrorist threats
and the need to protect the personal security of numerous athletes and
spectators.83 Perhaps Professor Peters would agree that general knowledge of a
possible plot posed "concrete indications founding a suspicion that terrorist. . .
interference with the right to privacy complies with the principles of legality, proportionality and
necessity"). It is unknown why the Committee chose to use a "necessity" test that only appears in
the European Convention with respect to limitations of the right to privacy. No citations appear
in support of its use of this manifestly incorrect test. A change to a necessity test would have to
occur by amendment to the treaty or through a new Protocol to the ICCPR, which would only
bind the parties thereto and their nationals. See infra Section V.
82 See Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. ("The collection of signals intelligence is
necessary ... [and our] capabilities must also be agile enough to enable us to focus on fleeting
opportunities or emerging crises and to address ... issues of tomorrow, which we may not be
able to foresee."), § 2 ("Locating new or emerging threats and other vital national security
information is difficult, as such information is often hidden within the large and complex system
of modern global communications. The United States must consequently collect signals
intelligence in bulk [sic] in certain circumstances."); Margulies, supra note 35, at 2152 ("NSA
surveillance is not arbitrary under Article 17 [of the ICCPR], because it targets terrorists, national
security threats, and espionage in a tailored fashion."); infra text accompanying notes 85, 93.
83 See, for example, Steven Lee Myers, An Olympics in the Shadow of a War Zone, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2014, at Al; Thom Shanker, U.S. and Russia Discuss Oympic Securiy, N.Y. TIMiES, Jan. 22, 2014, at
A7 (discussing sophisticated electronic equipment to be "integrated into the communications
networks"); Steven Lee Myers, Intensive Securiy for Winter Olympics, N.Y. TIMESJan. 19, 2014, at A6
(detailing efforts "to update the country's eavesdropping system, known as SORM, to monitor
virtually all communications in Sochi"). If the U.S. participated in surveillance of communications
in Russia, it would have been with the consent of the Russian government. The security efforts
engaged in during the Olympics met with little uproar, and the U.S. Department of State warned
"that no one attending the Olympics should expect privacy, noting that Russian law 'permits the
monitoring, retention and analysis of all data that traverses Russian communication networks,
including internet browsing, email messages, telephone calls and fax transmissions.' Id at A6
(internal quotation omitted).
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acts ... [were] being planned"8 4 during the Olympics and, therefore, justified use
of widespread and systematic searches and data collection.
With respect to suspicious calls to alleged terrorists, a Second Circuit
opinion has held that search by U.S. intelligence operatives of a U.S. citizen's
home in Kenya and electronic surveillance of land-based and cellular phones
met the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness and that, under the
circumstances, no U.S. warrant was needed for the extraterritorial search and
surveillance." The U.S. operatives had been working with Kenyan authorities
and had unearthed evidence of calls to five phone numbers known to be used by
suspected al-Qaeda associates. The opinion highlighted four compelling reasons
why the search and surveillance at issue were reasonable:
First, complex, wide-ranging, and decentralized organizations, such as al
Qaeda, warrant sustained and intense monitoring in order to understand
their features and identify their members.... Second, foreign intelligence
gathering of the sort considered here must delve into the superficially
mundane because it is not always readily apparent what information is
relevant.... Third, members of covert terrorist organizations, as with other
sophisticated criminal enterprises, often communicate in code, or at least
through ambiguous language.... Fourth, because the monitored conver-
sations were conducted in foreign languages, the task of determining
relevance and identifying coded language was further complicated. Because
the surveillance of suspected al Qaeda operatives must be sustained and
thorough in order to be effective, we cannot conclude that the scope of the
government's electronic surveillance was overbroad. While the intrusion on
[the defendant's] privacy was great, the need for the government to so
intrude was even greater.86
More recently, a federal court in the District of Columbia held that
complainants' case against the National Security Agency's (NSA) wholesale
collection and analysis of the phone record metadata of U.S. citizens
"demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their Fourth
Amendment claim," and it granted a motion for preliminary injunctive relief.
The judge claimed that decades-old precedent "has been eclipsed by
technological advances and a cell phone-centric lifestyle heretofore
inconceivable,"88 and, although the judge accepted the executive's claim that "the
84 Peters, supra note 33.
85 See generaly In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa (Fourth Amendment
Challenges), United States v. Odeh, 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1137 (2010).
86 Id. at 176. See Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 1 (as quoted stupra note 82).
87 See generaly Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2013).
88 Id. at 43. See id. at 30, 33 (addressing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), which used the third
party doctrine discussed in note 44, supra, and declaring that "the almost-Orwellian technology
that enables the Government to store and analyze the phone metadata of every telephone user in
the United States is unlike anything that could have been conceived in 1979," respectively).
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public's interest in combating terrorism is of paramount importance," he noted
that it had not proven that removal of the complainants "from the database will
'degrade' the [NSA] program in any meaningful sense."" The judge noted that
the NSA program involved an indiscriminate collection of metadata "without
any particularized suspicion of wrongdoing" 0 and, for several reasons, decided
that the program "almost certainly does violate a reasonable expectation of
privacy."" Addressing the point that widespread awareness of the NSA program
might lead to acceptance of a diminution of privacy, the judge stated that it is
more likely that such has "resulted in a greater expectation of privacy and a
recognition that society views that expectation as reasonable."92
Thereafter, a lower court in New York took note of the District of
Columbia opinion but ruled quite differently. Relying on prior Supreme Court
precedent "that an individual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in
information provided to third parties,"" the court held that the NSA's metadata
collection program did not violate the Fourth Amendment.94 The court also
noted that "[t]he effectiveness of bulk telephony metadata collection cannot be
seriously disputed" and that the executive had disclosed some examples of
89 Id. at 43 (internal quotation omitted).
90 Id. at 30.
91 Id. at 32. The judge also stated that he "cannot imagine a more indiscriminate and arbitrary
invasion than this systematic and high-tech collection and retention of personal data on virtually
every single citizen," especially where "the Government does not cite a single instance in which
analysis of the NSA's bulk metadata collection actually stopped an imminent attack." Id. at 40-42
(emphasis and quotation omitted).
92 Id. at 36 (emphasis omitted). See discussion supra notes 47-48.
93 See American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), citing Smith
v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 742. The opinion also cited United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173, 190
(2d Cit. 2004) (withholding third party doctrine protection from information on a home
computer that is transmitted over the internet or by email). See Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 750
n.16.
94 See Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 757. The opinion also noted that "[f]ifteen different FISC judges
have found the metadata collection lawful a total of thirty-five times since May 2006." Id at 756.
One such opinion is that of Judge Claire V. Eagan in In re Application of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things From [Redacted],
Docket No. BR 13-109 (U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. Aug. 29, 2013), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/ brl3-09-primary-order.pdf. Judge Eagan found
Smith v. Maryland controlling and held that government access to a telephone company's
"metadata in bulk ... without specifying the particular number of an individual" did not intrude
on individuals' reasonable expectations of privacy. Id. at 6-8. Judge Eagan also noted that "known
and unknown international terrorist operatives are using telephone communications, and .. . it is
necessary to obtain the bulk collection of a telephone company's metadata to determine those
connections between known and unknown international terrorist operatives as part of authorized
investigations." Id. at 18. See David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of Tangible Things, 7 J. NAT'I.
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 209, 226 (2014).
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successful use of collected data."s Appellate courts addressing the Fourth
Amendment issue will likely add their gloss on contextually relevant
reasonableness. Although not determinative with respect to the Constitution,
other federal courts might note that some forms of surveillance are permissible
under international law" and use international law to inform the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.97
2. Unlawful.
What conduct is necessarily unlawful within the meaning of Article 17 of
the ICCPR is partly ambiguous, especially with respect to what laws control.
Theoretically, whether U.S. interferences with privacy in a foreign country are
unlawful might simply depend on whether they are unlawful under foreign
domestic law. For example, hacking and placement of worms, bugging devices,
or other malware by U.S. agents operating in Germany could violate German
95 Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d at 756-57 ("Technology allowed al-Qaeda to operate decentralized and
plot international terrorist attacks remotely. The bulk telephony metadata collection program
represents the Government's counter-punch: connecting fragmented and fleeting
communications to re-construct and eliminate al-Qaeda's terror network. . . . There is no evidence
that the Government has used any of the bulk telephony metadata it collected for any purpose
other than investigating and disrupting terrorist attacks.").
96 See, for example, sources cited infra notes 98, 99, 109, 113, 119-120, and accompanying text.
97 See, for example, United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cit. 1974) ("[I]e must be
guided by the underlying principle that the government should be denied the right to exploit its
own illegal conduct ... [and h]aving unlawfully seized the defendant in violation of the Fourth
Amendment . .. the government ... should return him.' (emphasis omitted); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551 (2005) (using human rights precepts as an aid for interpreting the Eighth
Amendment); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (using the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination for guidance
regarding affirmative action); Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, 132-33 (1923) (Sutherland,
J., dissenting) (looking to international law to interpret the Eighteenth Amendment); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 et seq. (1893) (holding that international legal principles
bear on assessing congressional power regarding exclusion and deportation of aliens); Brown v.
United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 125 (1814) (holding that "a construction ought not lightly
to be admitted which would" not be in conformity with or "fetter" discretion under customary
international laws of war "which may enable the government to apply to the enemy the rule that
he applies to us"); United States v. Tinoco, 304 F.3d 1088, 1110 n.21 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding due
process requirements met when the U.S. has protective jurisdiction under international law);
United States v. Caicedo, 47 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Principles of international law are
'useful as a rough guide' in determining whether application of the statute would violate due
process.... The First, Second, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits agree that the United States
may exercise jurisdiction consistent with international law.") (quoting United States v. Davis, 905
F.2d 245, 249 n.2 (9th Cit. 1990)); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1458 (D.C. Cit. 1986)
(classifying the international legal duty of the U.S. as a "compelling national interest" for First
Amendment analysis); United States v. Usama bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 220 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) ("[I]f the extraterritorial application of a statute is justified by the protective principle [of
customary international law regarding jurisdiction], such application accords with due process.").
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law. Even if such conduct occurs on a U.S. embassy compound in Berlin, it will
occur in Germany because, under international law, the embassy compound is
German territory (even though international law places far-reaching limits on
Germany's ability to enforce its laws on embassy grounds)." Although there
would still be questions about whether a person was within the actual power or
effective control of the United States, an interference with the person's privacy
interest occurred, and the interference was arbitrary, presumably an interference
can also violate ICCPR human rights law if it is unlawful in this way (that is,
under foreign domestic law).
On the other hand, if no relevant U.S. conduct takes place in Germany,
and information is merely intercepted in the U.S. on a U.S. satellite orbiting in
outer space or on a U.S. vessel on the high seas, German law might not apply.
For example, it is generally accepted that mere receipt of information or remote
sensing from a satellite, as opposed to purposely transmitting information from
a satellite into a foreign state, is permissible." Similarly, receipt of information
on a U.S. vessel on the high seas would be permissible under international law."oo
Moreover, as noted in Section III, it is likely that claimants would not be within
the actual power or effective control of the United States and, therefore, could
not enjoy a relevant right under the ICCPR.
Also relevant is the prohibition under customary international law of the
use of "police" or "law enforcement" powers or enforcement jurisdiction in a
foreign state without consent from the highest level of that state or a prior
98 See, for example, RESTATEMENT, suipra note 3, § 466, cmnt. a; PAUST, VAN DYKE & MALONE, supra
note 15, at 660.
99 See, for example, CARL Q. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 76-77 (1991)
(arguing that the "open skies" principle has prevailed over claims to absolute privacy regarding
remote sensing activities from space); PETER P.C. HAANAPPEL, THE LAW AND POLICY OF AIR
SPACE AND OUTER SPACE 159-60 (2003) ("[R]emote sensing activities from outer space, civil and
military, are legal."); Major Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in
Shace, 48 A.F. L. REv. 1, 66 (2000) ("States are free to make full use of military reconnaissance
satellites."), 94 (pointing out that spy satellite "acquisition of information" has "been recognized
as lawful"). See also infra text accompanying notes 100, 102.
100 See, for example, JOHN NORTON MOORE, FREDERICK S. TIPSON & ROBERT F. TURNER, NATIONAL
SECURITY LAW 438 (1990) ("Ships have been traditional platforms for the gathering of
intelligence.. . . Where this collection is carried out from international waters, it is accomplished
in accordance with the customary right of freedom of navigation."); Jonathan G. Odom, The True
'lies" of the Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, Who Disregarded International Law, and Why EveU
Nation (Outside of China) Should Be Concerned, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 411, 440 (2010); United States
Protests Chinese Interference with U.S. Naval Vessel, Vows Continued Operations, 103 Am. J. INT'l L. 349,
350-51 (2009). Nonetheless, such conduct must otherwise concern peaceful purposes. See, for
example, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 88, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
3 ("The high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.").
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international agreement."o' One commentator has noted that the ECHR, while
finding relevant privacy claims inadmissible, recognizes that enforcement
jurisdiction is not exercised in a foreign state if an eavesdropping state merely
listens and gathers information via international wireless telecommunications
from within its own territory:
[T]he ECHR [has] held [with respect to German eavesdropping] that as
"[s]ignals emitted from foreign countries are monitored by interception sites
situated on German soil and the data collected are used in Germany" the
German authorities "have [not] acted in a manner which interfered with the
territorial sovereignty of foreign States ["as protected in public international
law"]." This applied to communication not transmitted by fixed/land lines
but only to information transmitted by radio signlas [sic] via satellites
etc. ... So by analogy, if the U.S. only intercepted signals emitted from
Germany using interception sites situated within U.S. territory (and not on
embassy premises) and if the data thus acquired was used only in the U.S. -
[sic] then the U.S. has not acted "in a manner which interfered with the
territorial sovereignty" of Germany.102
One commentator has also rightly noted that important questions necessarily
arise regarding how surveillance is carried out:
[The U.S. may have tapped mobile phones, but ... my question is: how?
Has it placed bugs inside such phones? Or has it eavesdropped such
communication over airwaves? If so, from where is it listening in? Or again
has it used recording available in hardware, such as servers or satellites? The
means are important because not every action can be seen as an
"extraterritorial" exercise of [enforcement] jurisdiction. If the U.S. simply
mines the data available on servers present in U.S. territory or in U.S.
controlled satellites, this will "merely" constitute an exercise of [U.S.]
10 See, for example, RESTATEMENT, sup~ra note 3, §§ 432-433; IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPIs OF PUBLIc
INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (4th ed. 1990); LAsSA F. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw 295 & n.1
(H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955); PAUST, VAN DYKE & MALONE, supra note 15, at 658-69; see
also Eur. Par. Draft, supra note 48, J (suggesting a need to use Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
that are operative under a law enforcement paradigm). The person directly affected by
impermissible law enforcement abroad has standing to complain in some instances. See
REsTATEMNT, supra note 3, § 432, RN 1, § 433, cmt. c. However, such a person does not have
standing regarding an alleged violation of the ICCPR unless the person is within the jurisdiction
or actual power or effective control of the U.S. See supra Section III.
102 See Matthew, Response (Nov. 6, 2013), in Peters, supra note 33. In the case mentioned, the ECHR
also found that under the circumstances "there existed adequate and effective guarantees against
abuses of ... [Germany's] strategic monitoring powers [and that Germany was] entitled to
consider the interferences with the secrecy of telecommunications ... to have been necessary in a
democratic society in the interests of national security and for the prevention of crime [under
Article 8(2)]." Weber and Saravia, supra note 39, 1 107, 118, 137 (regarding the Court's
consideration of context and interests at stake).
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territorial jurisdiction.03
Yet if hacking of foreign computer systems or placement of worms, bugs, or
other malware into foreign computer systems occurs through the internet or
wireless telecommunication and emanates from the United States, some might
claim that conduct starting in the U.S. continued, by fiction, into the foreign
state-additionally, that there was an intent to produce effects in, as well as
resulting effects within, the foreign state. The claim would be that the U.S. has
engaged in police or law enforcement-type conduct in another state without its
consent. Under customary international law, the foreign state would have a form
of territorial jurisdictional competence known as objective territorial jurisdiction
to prescribe domestic laws to reach such conduct abroad.' Three common
factors regarding this form of prescriptive jurisdiction would be met: an intent to
produce effects, actual effects, and, under both the innocent agency rationale
and the continuing act rationale, acts occurring by fiction within the foreign
state.'s If the foreign state exercised such a competence by prescribing relevant
extraterritorial law, the reach of its extraterritorial law would be legitimate--even
though the foreign state could not exercise its enforcement jurisdiction until
alleged perpetrators were physically present in its territory. The existence of
foreign state law supported by such a prescriptive competence might arguably
render a relevant invasion of privacy from abroad unlawful within the meaning
of Article 17 of the ICCPR.
However, one response might argue that only an actual use of law
enforcement powers or enforcement jurisdiction in the foreign state by
governmental personnel or their agents operating therein should be covered
under Article 17, especially if the state engaged in surveillance and data
collection does not have actual power or effective control over a privacy
claimant. This seems to be the ECHR's approach, which emphasizes that it is
the physical exercise of enforcement powers within a foreign state that interferes
with its territorial sovereignty.' An additional problem exists regarding
conflicting laws. What if an intrusion is lawful under U.S. domestic law but
unlawful under foreign domestic law? What domestic law should prevail with
103 Andre de Hoogh, Response (Nov. 1, 2013), in Anne Peters, Surveillance without Borders: The
Unlanfulness of the NSA Panopticon, Part I, EJIL TALK (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/
surveillance-without-borders-the-unlawfulness-of-the-nsa-panopticon (last visited Nov. 18, 2014).
104 See, for example, PAUST, VAN DYKE & MALONE, supra note 15, at 596-600, 621-27.
105 See id. at 597-600.
106 See, for example, supra text accompanying note 101; c Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, supra note 30,
T 131-36; supra text accompanying notes 98-99. But see Eur. Par. Draft, supra note 48, 1 24
(alleging the existence of a "breach of their sovereignty . . . perpetrated through the mass
surveillance programmes"). Certainly, remote sensing and surveillance do not physically or
forcefully infringe the territorial integrity of another state.
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respect to proper interpretation of Article 17 of the ICCPR? The answer is not
evident,o7 even under the present guidance from the Human Rights Committee
noted above.'08
What can complicate the inquiry further with respect to layered laws and
conflicts of law is that some forms of relevant conduct can be permissible under
international law. What if the United States does not claim to be acting under a
law enforcement paradigm but under the law of self-defense or the laws of war?
Human rights law would still be applicable,' but the salient question is whether
conduct that is lawful under international law should be so considered within the
meaning of Article 17 of the ICCPR even though it is unlawful under a foreign
state's domestic law. Should a self-defense or law-of-war competence, which can
recognizably make surveillance reasonable and not arbitrary within the meaning
of Article 17 of the ICCPR,"0 prevail for the purpose of interpreting the word
"unlawful"? Giving primacy to international law in this inquiry would seem to be
rational and policy-serving in view of (1) the importance of self-defense and law-
of-war needs and competencies, and (2) the well-recognized canon of treaty law
that relevant international law shall be used as an interpretive aid."' Nonetheless,
treaty terms must also be interpreted in light of their ordinary meaning and the
object and purpose of the treaty.1 12 However, a core of ordinary or generally
107 See Professor Stefan Talmon, Tapping the German Chancellor's Cell Phone and Public International Law
(Nov. 6, 2013), http://cjic.org.uk/2013/11/06/tapping-german-chancellors-cell-phone-public-
international-law (last visited Nov. 20, 2014) (concluding that U.S. law would be the relevant law,
and not German law, if spying on Germans was only engaged in by agents operating within the
U.S.).
1os See supra text accompanying notes 52-53. When considering the propriety of NSA surveillance of
communications, the Human Rights Committee merely addressed the need for the U.S. to assure
that its domestic law will allow it to fulfill obligations under the Covenant. See H.R. Comm.,
Concluding Observations on the Fourth Report of the United States of America, supra note 33, 1 22(b)
(recommending, inter alia, that it "[e]nsure that any interference ... [be] authorized by laws that (i)
are publicly accessible; [and] (ii) contain provisions that ensure ... [U.S. surveillance activities] are
tailored to specific legitimate aims").
109 See discussion supra note 7.
110 With respect to another human right contained in the ICCPR and conditioned by the word
"arbitrary," the ICJ declared that "whether a particular loss of life ... is to be considered as
arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by
reference to the law applicable in armed conflict." Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear
Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 25 (July 8).
111 See, for example, Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31(3)(c). Relevant international law would
include the right to receive information and sensing from satellites in space and vessels on the
high seas (see discussion supra notes 99-100), the law of self-defense (see discussion infra note
119), and the laws of war (see discussion infra note 120).
112 See Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 31(1). Some also regard surveillance programs as
"changing the established paradigm of criminal law[,] ... promoting instead a mix of law
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shared meaning of the word "unlawful" can expand or contract over time,
especially as expectations shift regarding the legal propriety of particular
practices, and thereby leave logically possible aspects of meaning outside of
normative protection."'
Also complicating rational and policy-serving choice is the widespread
recognition that espionage engaged in by a state within a foreign state can violate
the latter's domestic law, but widely practiced espionage regarding foreign state
secrets is not a violation of international law.114 Moreover, the widespread
practice of espionage and transnational surveillance by governments from
satellites in space and ships at sea"' compels recognition that customary
international law based on general patterns of practice and opiniojuris does not
exist such as would preclude these specific practices."'
My preference is to interpret the word "unlawful" in Article 17 so as to
give primacy to international law,'17 and especially to competences under the law
of self-defense and the laws of war when such laws are applicable. The
international lawfulness of particular measures of self-defense, war, and state
surveillance (from satellites and ships at sea) can buttress claims that particular
forms of privacy intrusion are rational, reasonable, and not arbitrary under the
circumstances,"' and should inform the legal meaning of the word "unlawful" in
enforcement and intelligence activities with blurred legal safeguards, often not in line with
democratic checks and balances and fundamental rights." Eur. Par. Draft, supra note 48, 1 10.
113 See generally Paust, Basic Forms of International Law, supra note 46.
114 See, for example, PAUST FT AL., supra note 7, at 740; Geoffrey B. Demarest, Espionage in International
Law, 24 DENV. J. INT'L L. & Poi.'Y 321, 347 (1996); Roger D. Scott, Territoriall Intrusive Intelligence
Collection and International Lam, 46 A.F. L. Riv. 217, 218 (1999); Talmon, supra note 107; United
States ex rel. Wessels v. McDonald, 265 F. 754, 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1920) ("[Ulnder the international
law, spying is not a crime."). qA. John Radsan, The Unresolved Equation ofEspionage and International
Law, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 595, 620-21 (2007) (arguing that "[i]nternational law does affect one
aspect of international espionage"-when those engaged in espionage are listed as diplomats "on
the diplomatic roster," their acts are not within "the Vienna Convention's list of permitted
diplomatic activities").
115 See discussion supra notes 99-100 (concerning receipt of information and remote sensing from
satellites in space and vessels on the high seas).
116 The 1995 Report of the ILA Human Rights Committee noted that the content and contours of
the right to privacy vary considerably. See ILA H.R. Report, supra note 3 at 547. If so, some
privacy interests might be supported by generally shared patterns of practice and opiniojuris and,
therefore, be part of customary international law. However, when there is a widespread practice
opposing a particular privacy interest, that interest cannot be protected as customary international
law.
117 At least with respect to the primacy of obligations under international law, it is well recognized
that a failure to comply with an obligation cannot be justified by compliance with or the reach of
domestic law. See, for example, Vienna Convention, supra note 11, art. 27; PAUST, VAN DYKE &
MALONE, supra note 15, at 29-30, 770-71, 823-24.
118 See discussion supra note 111.
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the ICCPR."' For example, when acting in self-defense under Article 51 of the
UN Charter against a private non-state actor (such as al-Qaeda) engaged in a
process of continued armed attacks against a state's territory, its embassies
abroad, its military personnel, and other nationals, a responding state lawfully
uses self-defense by monitoring, inside a foreign state, cell phone and email
communications of the non-state actor's known and suspected members, as well
as those who directly facilitate armed attacks, in order to identify their plans and
activities and learn their whereabouts. 20 Under the circumstances, monitoring
would be markedly rational, reasonable, and lawful as self-defense and should be
recognized as lawful within the meaning of Article 17 of the ICCPR. In the same
way, monitoring the phone and email messages of enemy combatants and
civilians directly participating in an international armed conflict is permissible
under the laws of war'21 and should also be lawful within the meaning of Article
17 of the ICCPR.
V. POLICY-SERVING REFORM
Despite widespread awareness of the NSA program and increasing
awareness of other states' programs for extraterritorial data collection and
119 See discussion supra note 111 (establishing that international law is background for interpretation
of treaties).
120 With respect to the propriety of capture or targeting of such non-state actors under the law of
self-defense-regardless of the consent of a foreign state-see generally Jordan J. Paust, Self-
Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibilty of U.S. Use of Drones in Pakistan, 19 J.
TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 237 (2010); Jordan J. Paust, Permissible Self-Defense Targetings and the Death of
bin Laden, 39 DENv.J. INT'L L. & Pot'Y 569 (2011).
121 See, for example, Hague Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,
Annex, art. 24, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 15 U.N.T.S. 9 ("[The employment of measures
necessary for obtaining information about the enemy and the country are considered
permissible."); U.K. MINISTRY OF DELFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
(2004) § 4.9.3 (stating that the "obtaining of intelligence about the enemy ... by satellites and
drones" is among the types of permissible "measures necessary for the obtaining of intelligence in
enemy-held territory" that the Hague Convention "formally sanctioned"), § 5.15.1 ("Information
can lawfully be gleaned in many different ways, for example, by ... the use of reconnaissance
aircraft and satellites."); YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HoSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 208 (2004) ("Article 24 of the Hague Regulations ... ensues
[sic] that a belligerent may resort to any intelligence-gathering method, including (in the modern
age) the use of electronic devices, wire tapping, code breaking and aerial or satellite
photography."); Margulies, supra note 35, at 2155-56 ("Reconnaissance and surveillance of
another party to an armed conflict is an accepted incident of war . .. [and a] rigid application of
the ICCPR that precludes such observation would fundamentally reshape the law of armed
conflict.") (internal citation omitted). See also Instructions for the Government of Armies of the
United States in the Field, General Orders No. 100 (1863) (the Lieber Code), art. 15 (instructing
that "[m]ilitary necessity ... allows all ... obstruction of the ways and channels of...
communication" of the enemy).
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mining, there seem to remain generally shared expectations that privacy with
respect to internet and international telecommunications should still exist in
some form. In light of this, I recommend creation of a Protocol to the ICCPR
to reflect the more nuanced and restrictive form of limitation found in the
European Convention: "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security."122 If so, the present "arbitrary" or unreasonable standard
would shift to one that will require any interference with privacy and private
communication to be reasonably necessary under the circumstances. 123 This will
not guarantee freedom from interference: no human rights standard presently
does. Although a reasonably necessary standard might still allow use of a
program for the widespread and systematic extraterritorial monitoring, data
collection, and data mining that President Obama has stated is necessary,'24 it
would better accommodate interests in privacy, personal security, and national
security than would a less stringent standard tied to the word "arbitrary."
One significant limitation regarding extraterritorial surveillance under
122 See European Convention, supra note 30, art. 8(2). The "necessary in a democratic society"
standard will help to alleviate abusive interference with the human right to participate in
democratic governmental processes and self-determination of peoples. See also Eur. Par. Draft,
supra note 48, 111 (calling "on Member States ... to advocate the adoption of an additional
protocol to Article 17. .. which should be based on the standards ... endorsed by the ... [35th
International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners] and the provisions in
General Comment No 16 to the Covenant"). The phrase "necessary in a democratic society"
already cabins those limitations to freedoms of assembly and association that are set forth in the
ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 9, arts. 21, 22(2). However, the European Convention is the only
treaty that presently uses a "necessary" standard with respect to limitations of privacy. See
discussion supra note 38.
123 I do not recommend that a new Protocol adopt the "strictly and demonstrably necessary"
standard preferred by Special Rapporteur La Rue and more recently by the ECHR. See La Rue
Report, supra note 29, 83(b); Digital Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communications et al.,
Ireland, Eur. Ct. H.R. (udgment, Grand Chamber) (Apr. 8, 2014), 52 (stating that "derogations
and limitations in relation to the protection of personal data must apply only in so far as is strictly
necessary"). Note that the ECHR fused two different tests applicable in different contexts for
different purposes. Importantly, Article 8(2) of the Convention merely requires that an
interference be "in accordance with the law and . . . necessary," whereas a derogation under
Article 15(1) must be "strictly required." European Convention, supra note 30, arts. 8(2), 15(1)); see
discussion supra note 81. In my view, a strictly necessary standard would result in undue emphasis
on admittedly non-absolute privacy interests and would not allow adequate accommodation of
competing rights of others to dignity and personal security (regarding the need to consider human
rights of other persons, see supra text accompanying notes 54, 57, 59, 68, 72, and 79) or the duty
of states to seek to achieve personal security for all persons within their jurisdiction. See discussion
supra note 72. If other courts misinterpret the word "necessary" to mean strictly necessary, in view
of the danger posed to the rights of others, I would abandon my preference for a Protocol that
creates a new threshold of necessity.
124 See Presidential Policy Directive, supra note 1, pmbl. (using "necessary"); In re Application of the
FBI, supra note 94, at 18 (writing for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Judge Eagan also
used "necessary").
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programs like the NSA's would remain: the need for a claimant to be within the
actual power or effective control of the United States. I doubt that the United
States and other countries engaged in extraterritorial surveillancel25 will agree to
change the actual power or effective control test that is applicable under the
ICCPR, and I do not recommend that such a change appear in a new Protocol.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has demonstrated that at least four questions can arise under
human rights law with respect to extraterritorial surveillance, collection of data,
and data mining by a state: (1) is the claimant within the actual power or
effective control of the state using such measures; (2) does the claimant have a
protectable interest in privacy or private communication; (3) does use of the
measures interfere with a protectable privacy interest of the claimant; and (4) is
the interference permissible under the "arbitrary" and "unlawful" substantive
legal standards and limitations, or in view of other types of limitation that are set
forth in an applicable human rights instrument? With respect to extraterritorial
surveillance and data collection, most claimants will not be within the actual
power or effective control of the state using extraterritorial measures and,
therefore, under the ICCPR and most human rights instruments, their human
rights to privacy and private communication will not obtain.126 However, if the
rights to privacy and private communication or a particular aspect thereof are
part of customary human rights law, the customary rights will be protected
universally under the UN Charter without an exclusion of persons who are not
within the jurisdiction, actual power, or effective control of a state,127 and the
inquiry will shift to the remaining three questions.
The requirement that an interference not be "arbitrary" actually grants wide
latitude to monitoring states, because systematic surveillance and data collection
is not prima facie irrational, unreasonable, and arbitrary. One must make choices
with respect to various features of factual context, rights, and policies at stake
when deciding whether a particular interference is arbitrary or unreasonable, and
the permissibility of particular forms of surveillance under international law can
inform any such policy-serving choice. A nuanced and considered choice would
125 Concerning the push for extraterritorial surveillance by several countries, see, for example, La Rue
Report, supra note 29, 1 64 (identifying South Africa, the Netherlands, and Pakistan); Nyst, supra
note 34 ("The- patchwork of secret spying programmes and intelligence-sharing agreements
implemented by. .. the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand[ ] constitutes an
integrated global surveillance arrangement that covers the majority of the world's
communications."). See also discussion supra note 83 (regarding Russian surveillance); supra text
accompanying note 102 (regarding Germany).
126 See supra Section III.
127 See discussion supra notes 3, 6.
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avoid focusing merely on the rights of privacy claimants and instead involve
adequate attention to the rights of others, including human rights to dignity and
personal security as well as the concomitant duties of states to seek to achieve
personal security for all who are within their jurisdiction. If the international
community prefers to achieve greater protection for privacy interests under
global human rights law, a Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights could limit extraterritorial surveillance to those interventions
"necessary in a democratic society."
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